The Politics of Deuteronomy

Edited by
BILL T. ARNOLD

Forschungen
zum Alten Testament 2. Reihe
156

Mohr Siebeck

Forschungen zum Alten Testament
2. Reihe

Edited by

Corinna Körting (Hamburg) · Konrad Schmid (Zürich)
Mark S. Smith (Princeton) · Andrew Teeter (Harvard)

156

The Politics of Deuteronomy

Edited by

Bill T. Arnold

with the assistance of
Harald Samuel

Mohr Siebeck

Bill T. Arnold, born 1955; 1985 PhD, Hebraic and Cognate Studies, Hebrew Union College (Cincinnati); Paul S. Amos Professor of Old Testament Interpretation, Asbury Theological Seminary.

Harald Samuel, born 1979; 2014 Dr. theol. in Old Testament/Hebrew Bible, University of Göttingen; 2020 Habilitation; Senior Lecturer in Hebrew and Hebrew Bible at Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen.

ISBN 978-3-16-163909-8 / eISBN 978-3-16-163910-4
DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-163910-4

ISSN 1611-4914 / eISSN 2568-8367 (Forschungen zum Alten Testament, 2. Reihe)

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available at *https://dnb.dnb.de*.

© 2025 Mohr Siebeck Tübingen, Germany. www.mohrsiebeck.com

This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher's written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems.

The book was typeset by Martin Fischer in Tübingen using Minion typeface, printed on non-aging paper and bound by AZ Druck in Kempten.

Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, Wilhelmstraße 18, 72074 Tübingen, Germany
www.mohrsiebeck.com, info@mohrsiebeck.com

Preface

This volume would not have been possible without the contributions of a number of persons working together to bring it to completion. In particular, I am most grateful to my erstwhile co-chair of SBL's Deuteronomy Program Unit, Dr. Harald Samuel, who was instrumental in visualizing and giving structure to the book at its beginning stages, and who edited early drafts of a few of its chapters. I am also grateful to Tobias Stäbler and Markus Kirchner of Mohr Siebeck for their work in the production stages. Finally, the Press and I express our appreciation to my research assistants, Evan Lee for his careful copyediting of the manuscript and David Clayton for building the indexes.

Bill T. Arnold

Table of Contents

Preface V

Bill T. Arnold
Introduction: Political Theory and Interpretive Possibilities in Deut 16:18–18:22 1

Part I

The Book of Deuteronomy in Political Theory

Francis Borchardt
Judge, King, Priest, Prophet: The Invention of Authority in Deut 16:18–18:22 7

Madhavi Nevader
Reading Politics and the Politics of Reading: Deuteronomy as Test Case ... 21

Brent A. Strawn
Once Again on Deuteronomic 'Constitutionalism': Revision, Amendment, and the Practice(s) of Reading 49

Anselm C. Hagedorn
Judges Between Sovereignty of Law and Limitations of Justice: Deut 16:18–20 in its Mediterranean Context 79

Carmen Palmer
Reframing Deuteronomy's Law of the King Through the Lens of Israelite Identity 99

Part II

The So-Called Constitutional Passage: Deut 16:18–18:22

Bruce Wells
Political and Administrative Ideals in Deuteronomy and Sixth-Century Babylonia 119

Bill T. Arnold
Deuteronomy's Justice Manifesto: The Significance of 'Correct Decision(s)' in Deut 16:18 143

Reinhard Müller
Instructions on Judiciary: A Fundamental Section of *Urdeuteronomium* (Deut 16:18–20*; 17:8–13*) 169

Kevin Mattison
Deuteronomy's Law of the King (Deut 17:14–20) as an Ancient Emoluments Clause: Protecting the King's Powers Against Corruption 201

Sandra Jacobs
Burning Children? Deuteronomy and its Hermeneutic of Dissent 229

List of Contributors 269

Index of Sources 271
Index of Names 283
Index of Subjects 285

Introduction: Political Theory and Interpretive Possibilities in Deut 16:18–18:22

Bill T. Arnold

Many years ago, the political philosopher Eric Voegelin opined that the traditions now found in the book of Deuteronomy constitute "the crystallizing nucleus of the Bible."[1] That may be true with regard to the broad conceptualizing of the character of Israel's God YHWH, his covenant with Israel, and the theological significance of those traditions generally. But the same cannot be said of the important portion at the center of Deuteronomy – the so-called Law of Offices in Deut 16:18–18:22. Many questions remain about this portion of the book. Far from crystallizing a "nucleus" for the rest of the Bible, we are left with uncertainty about the role it played in the history of pre-exilic Judah. Even its reception in the Persian period and in early Judaism is unclear. Did this text have any paradigmatic significance at all, or was it a reflection of the idealistic vision of tradents who hoped for such a reality in the future? While we cannot answer these questions with confidence, scholars since Wellhausen have explored this portion of Deuteronomy as an early type of constitutional law, especially for the way it defines the responsibilities for four main human authorities in Israel: judges, kings, priests, and prophets. Indeed, this portrait of Israel's human leaders continues to fascinate us with possibilities, perhaps especially because of its suggestive significance for political theorists and legists even today.

The contributions in this volume stem in part from sessions of the Deuteronomy Program Unit of the Society of Biblical Literature. They have no genetic relationship other than the goal of investigating this important portion of the book from either a theoretical or exegetical perspective. Part One contains theoretical studies, while Part Two presents more exegetically-based investigations. It is hoped that together, they open new avenues for further research or add information to the body of research previously overlooked or inadequately explored.

The volume opens with a contribution by Francis Borchardt, who begins with the observation that the "constitutional system" envisioned in Deut 16:18–18:22 is *sui generis* in the ancient world. Borchardt addresses the problems of the way power itself is generated and distributed in such an ideal form of government.

[1] Eric Voegelin, *Order and History: Volume One, Israel and Revelation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 368.

Drawing on actor-network theory, an approach in the sociology of science that explores the study of authority, Borchardt argues that the constitutional passage of Deuteronomy establishes a truth regime in which all actors are legitimated through their success in enacting divine presence. Each official is endowed with authority only to the extent to which their performance embodies YHWH's continued activity among Israel. Each official is transformed into a carrier of YHWH's presence in Israel and the deity is transformed into a figure perennially active in Israel.

After a helpful overview of the way Deuteronomy has been read as a political document in biblical studies generally, Madhavi Nevader takes up the book's political purposes and the way scholarship has tended to ignore the single most important figure, who is the most consistent and fearsome political actor of the book – YHWH himself. She navigates several unsatisfying approaches to reading the politics of Deuteronomy, and then turns to the possibility of reading the book as apologetic, specifically as royal apologetic, compared to the ancient Near Eastern corpus. Finally, she shows how many contemporary readings of Deuteronomy as politics are skewed by the self-conscious reading of our own politics into the text, finding an unsubstantiated divide between East and West, between Biblical and Oriental, or between political and religious.

Brent A. Strawn revisits the question of Deuteronomy's genre, which is a question at the core of many of the other contributions in the volume. His essay argues that, given the legitimacy of the idea of Deuteronomy as a kind of constitution, it should be seen as a supplemental composition rather than as a replacement; that is, as the book now stands in the Pentateuch, its hermeneutic of legal revision(ism) is best understood as akin to constitutional amendment. From there, Strawn asks specifically what kind of politics is envisioned in Deuteronomy, concluding that the notion of "political theology" is a helpful category for its details, a perspective which he suggests understands the book as a "constituting" or "constitutive" type of text.

Starting with the principle of the separation of powers in Deut 16:18–18:22 as representing a link in political theory to early modern conceptions, Anselm Hagedorn raises the question of whether we can know how this relates to an *Urdeuteronomium*. By focusing on the earliest formulation of administration of justice in the book's legal core (Deut 12–26*), he works from a comparative legal perspective, drawing especially on Greek oratory and inscriptions, in order to investigate how politics and public order are shaped in the text. The contribution is also sensitive to the text's balance between legal innovation and traditional morals.

Carmen Palmer draws upon and combines recent developments in political theory and ethnic identity formation, exploring what these researches imply about Deuteronomy's "law of the king" in Deut 17:14–20. While others have understood the surprising (even unconventional) picture of the king as a model

for the Israelites, Palmer shows that the image also serves to construct and define the identity of the Israelites more broadly. By comparing the paragraph with the Temple Scroll, she demonstrates that the person of the king reflects the interests and ideological convictions of each author. The priestly interests of the Temple Scroll are most apparent there, whereas in Deut 17, the interest is the identity of the Israelite people themselves.

The second half of the volume opens with a comparative study by Bruce Wells. In his review of "political and administrative ideals" as presented in Deuteronomy, Wells investigates key aspects of this governmental system with similar features of the administrative system of southern Mesopotamia in the sixth century BCE. He shows that, in particular ways, Deuteronomy presented an ideal that mirrored corresponding concepts in the Neo-Babylonian system. The fact that the Babylonians (and Persians after them) were unable to bring such ideals to reality suggests that the tradents of Deut 16:18–18:22 did not expect to see their idealistic program come to fruition fully but sought instead to influence the political realities of their day, perhaps moving them closer to the aspirational goals outlined in the text.

My study of Deuteronomy's "Justice Manifesto" begins by focusing on the way the syntax of Deut 16:18–18:22 marks each new portion of its four-part structure, introducing in turn judges, kings, priests, and prophets. Yet this conventional way of dividing the material is also deceptively simple because it obscures an overarching interpretive principle that may shed light on all the laws in the passage, which are otherwise quite complex. The investigation reexamines the details of the unit and explores the possibility that a singular and foundational interpretive tenet gets lost in most treatments of the passage, or at least has been neglected in the secondary literature. My proposal is that the directive for the judges to perform their duties with "a judgement of righteousness" in 16:18b introduces the entire unit rather than only the local magistrates in 16:18–17:13. In subsequent verses, the phrase comes to serve as a social ideal, functioning as a literary touchstone for all of 16:18–18:22. In this way, Deuteronomy's constitutional ideal presents a vision for justice that begins with a mandate for justice in the narrower sense of wise court proceedings, but immediately expands the ideal to embody justice in all four officials on the way to establishing the prophetic ideal of social justice more broadly.

After a meticulous study of the layers of tradition in Deut 16:18–20 and 17:8–13, Reinhard Müller concludes that a core of those pericopes was part of *Urdeuteronomium* (16:18* and 17:8–9*), and that this original core of the book originated in the late-monarchic period. Furthermore, this original layer of text is paralleled in other ancient Near Eastern royal instruction, suggesting that the implied speaker of these instructions concerning the local and central judiciary was "none other than the king of Judah." During the exilic and post-exilic periods, these pericopes

were reworked in several subsequent layers, particularly reflecting the later covenant theology and other theological concerns of those respective eras.

Drawing upon mainstream scholarship of the "law of the king" (17:14–20), Kevin Mattison observes that the preceding laws in the extended unit (16:18–17:13) assign judicial responsibility to judges and priests, creating a self-contained court system with no need for a king. Mattison then reexamines the widely held assumption that the image of the king here deprives the king of power, but instead protects those powers against corruption, allowing him to retain all that is not explicitly prohibited. He argues that Deut 17:14–20 assumes, as its original audience must have assumed, that the king would continue to hold vast powers. Rather than a shadow king, as is often assumed in the literature, the text envisions a powerful monarch who was a champion and enforcer of Deuteronomy's Torah.

The volume closes with a contribution by Sandra Jacobs on the notion of child sacrifice as it may have been known in the ancient Mediterranean and Levantine worlds. One's most precious physical issue, namely a child, and often a first-born child, was perceived as the ultimate gift to a god. Her examination of the prohibition of burning children in Deuteronomy 12:31 and 18:10–11 examines the language of these laws together with the phenomenon of trans-generational punishments. Such directives assert that the consequence of parental sin falls directly on their children–as was maintained also in the surety (or guarantee) clauses of Neo-Assyrian private loan and purchase contracts from the seventh century BCE. While Deuteronomy's bans qualify as another "hermeneutic of legal innovation," in keeping with Bernard Levinson's reconstruction, they nonetheless take a step further, by forbidding practices that were previously permitted. All acts of passing children through flames (including those with non-fatal consequences) are categorically outlawed in these laws, which constitute, alternatively, a hermeneutic of dissent.

Returning to Voegelin's thoughts about Deuteronomy as "the crystallizing nucleus of the Bible," he went on to assert

> One might even say there would have been no Bible, that is, no Book, unless the book had metamorphosed the history of Israel into the Torah and existence under God into existence under the written Law. That is a strange success for a book; and it suggests forces stronger than a mere literary whim, or the skill of a codifier, or the propitious moment of discovery.[2]

Indeed, the "strange success" of Deuteronomy is something the authors in this volume attempt to trace in our imaginations, and perhaps even in our own political realities. In this way, they contribute to the ongoing fascination with this text in the hopes of marking that strange success and perhaps moving it forward in our search for "*justice*, and only justice – justice without intermittence."[3]

---

[2] Voegelin, *Order and History*, 368.

[3] S. R. Driver commenting on Deut 16:20; *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy*, 3rd ed., ICC 5 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, [1895] 1965), 201 (emphasis his).

Part I

The Book of Deuteronomy in Political Theory

Judge, King, Priest, Prophet: The Invention of Authority in Deut 16:18–18:22

Francis Borchardt

1. Introduction: Power and the Deuteronomy Constitution

The constitutional passage of Deuteronomy has long been an object of scholarly fascination.[1] This should come as no surprise, as Deut 16:18–18:22 is often seen as a boundary marker, both providing a capstone for the instructional material that precedes it in the Pentateuch, and setting the stage for the historical drama that follows in Joshua through Kings.[2] It is thus studied both for its vision of Israelite society once it enters into Canaan, and for how that vision relates to the historical fiction that is played out in the narrative books following it in the traditional canon.[3] The problem of how power is distributed in the constitutional passage is

[1] See for example, Norbert Lohfink, "Die Sicherung der Wirksamkeit des Gotteswortes durch das Prinzip der Schriftlichkeit der Tora und durch das Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung nach Ämtergesetzen des Buches Deuteronomiums (Dt 16,18–18,22)," in *Testimonium Veritati: Philosophische und theologische Studien zu kirchlichen Fragen der Gegenwart*, ed. Hans Wolter, Frankfurter Theologische Studien 7 (Frankfurt am Main, Knecht, 1971), 143–55; Udo Rüterswörden, *Von der politischen Gemeinschaft zur Gemeinde. Studien zu Dt 16,18–18,22*, BBB 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1987); Eckhart Otto, "Von der Gerichtsordnung zum Verfassungsentwurf: Deuteronomische Gestaltung und deuteronomistische Interpretation im 'Ämtergesetz' Dtn 16,18–18,22," in *'Wer ist wie du, Herr, unter den Göttern?' Studien zu Theologie und Religionsgeschichte Israels: Festschrift für Otto Kaiser zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Ingo Kottsieper et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), 142–55; Christa Schäfer-Lichtenberger, "Der deuteronomische Verfassungsentwurf. Theologische Vorgaben als Gestaltungsprinzipien sozialer Realität," in *Bundesdokument und Gesetz: Studien zum Deuteronomium*, ed. Georg Braulik (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1995), 105–18; Jean-Marie Carrière, *La théorie politique dans le Deuteronome: Analyse des unités, des structures des concepts de Dt 16,18–18,22* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001); Bernard Levinson, "The First Constitution: Rethinking the Origins of Rule of Law and Separation of Powers in Light of Deuteronomy," *Cardozo Law Review* 27 (2006): 1853–88; David Flatto, "The King and I: The Separation of Powers in Early Hebraic Political Theory," *Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities* 61 (2008): 61–110; Mark O'Brien, "Deuteronomy 16.18–18.22: Meeting the Challenge of Towns and Nations," *JSOT* 33 (2008): 155–72.

[2] Ian Wilson, *Kingship and Memory in Ancient Judah* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 46–47; Dominik Markl, "Deuteronomy's 'Anti-King': Historicized Etiology or Political Program?" in *Changing Faces of Kingship in Syria-Palestine 1500–500 BCE*, ed. Agustinus Gianto and Peter Dubovsky (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2018), 165–86, esp. 178.

[3] Christophe Nihan, "Rewriting Kingship in Samuel: 1 Samuel 8 and 12 and the Law of the

a frequently recurring theme. The issue for many scholars amounts to this: Deuteronomy presents a notion of Israel wherein governing power is apportioned relatively equitably between judicial officers, Levites, a king, and a prophet. However, this idea of shared power is wildly at odds with ancient Near Eastern models of rule, *and* crucially distinct from depictions of the governing styles of several idealized monarchs in the books of Samuel and Kings.[4] Several questions arise out of this apparent incongruence. Does the constitutional passage invent the concept of separation of powers? If so, for what purposes, and serving whose interests? Further, under what historical circumstances might this section have been composed (whether there are one or many stages of composition)? Finally, how does this anomalous picture of governance in the ancient Near Eastern context relate to the more common picture known from Mesopotamian and Judahite sources?[5] A problem to which less scholarly attention has been devoted is how power is generated in the "constitutional system" envisioned in Deut 16:18–18:22. That is, in this radically new ideal of government, which figures bear authority, and from where do they derive it? Other than an occasional assertion that YHWH, or more commonly Torah, is the ultimate means of legitimation, much of scholarship has been content to slink past this problem to consider the issues already noted above.[6]

I think there is more to this problem, and my solution might impact how we answer some of the scholarly questions more commonly asked of this passage. I am arguing that the constitutional passage of Deuteronomy establishes a truth regime in which all actors, human and non-human, are legitimated through their success in enacting divine presence. That is, each official, whether judge, Levite, king, or prophet is endowed with authority only to the extent which their performance embodies YHWH's continued activity among Israel. This omnipresence of YHWH is realized in Deuteronomy's imagined interactions between diverse actors, through speech acts, rituals, performance, and the encounter with physical locations and objects. Through this network of interactions, each entity is transformed into a carrier of YHWH's presence in Israel, and thereby authorized to

King (Deuteronomy 17)," *HeBAI* 2 (2013): 315–50, is primarily interested in connection between part of this passage and the historical fiction that follows it. Levinson, "First," 1871–84, spends more time on the idealized vision in Deuteronomy itself.

[4] Patricia Dutcher-Walls, "The Circumscription of the King: Deuteronomy 17:16–17 in its Ancient Social Context," *JBL* 121 (2002): 601–16, esp. 605–6; Flatto, "King," 73–74; Nihan, "Rewriting," 319–21.

[5] On the idea of the constitutional passage being a birthplace for the separation of powers along with several divergent theories on the circumstances for its rise see Levinson, "First Constitution," 1887; Moshe Greenberg, "Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law," in *A Song of Power and the Power of Song: Essays on the Book of Deuteronomy*, ed. Duane Christensen (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1993), 283–300; Joshua Berman, *Created Equal: How the Bible Broke with Ancient Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 55.

[6] Two notable exceptions attending to how power is generated in this passage are, O'Brien, "Deuteronomy," 171; and Dutcher-Walls, "Circumscription," 605–7.

perform certain functions. In the same way, this network of interactions transforms YHWH from a conceivably distant deity of the imagined past, into a figure perennially active among the Israelites.

Because the study of authority fundamentally belongs to the realm of sociology, I shall approach this problem within the framework of actor-network theory. After introducing this framework and its applicability to the question at hand, I shall offer examples of how the constitutional passage constructs a truth regime in which YHWH's presence is the measure of reality. I shall then show how these examples interweave to make it so that what is determined to be legitimate, authentic, and true must enlist YHWH as a participant.

2. Actor-Network Theory and Multiple Ontologies

Actor-network theory is an approach developed within the sociology of science.[7] Its most notable proponent is Bruno Latour, so much so that the man and the framework have become nearly inseparable in the usage of later authors.[8] Latour constructed this approach as a way to answer one question: How do we know?[9] Latour neither conceives of this question as purely biological nor entirely philosophical. Instead, he frames it as a sociological problem. Initially, he turned his attention to laboratories in the natural and physical sciences, and later to other fields of activity.[10] In much of this work, he follows a generally pragmatist and constructivist program that is skeptical of the modernist idea of objective truth.[11] He contends that the impression of an objective reality which simply reflects nature is an artifact of scientific practice. Latour argues that this practice works to create the impression that it is only observing reality by erasing much of its

[7] Fabian Muniesa, "Actor-Network Theory," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, ed. James Wright, 2nd ed. (London: Elsevier, 2015), 80–84, esp. 80.

[8] See, for example, Yves Cittion, "Fictional Attachments and Literary Weavings in the Anthropocene," *New Literary History* 47 (2016): 309–29, esp. 309–10, where Cittion, in telling the story of the development of the approach, shifts between using the terminology of "Actor-Network Theory" and "Latourian".

[9] Bruno Latour, "'Thou Shalt Not Freeze-Frame,' or, How Not to Misunderstand the Science and Religion Debate," in *Science, Religion, and the Human Experience*, ed. James Proctor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27–48, esp. 28. In this chapter he frames his scholarly program as the study of truth production in science, technology, politics, economics, law, and religion.

[10] Graham Harman, *Bruno Latour: Reassembling the Political* (London: Pluto Press, 2014), vii–viii.

[11] Rita Felski, "Comparison and Translation: A Perspective from Actor-Network Theory," *Comparative Literature Studies* 53 (2016): 747–65, esp. 749 notes the ties to pragmatism and radical empiricism; Dave Elder-Vass, "Disassembling Actor-Network Theory," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 45 (2015): 100–21, esp. 101, ties Latour's method to social constructionism. Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 5–8, lays out his program in relation to other domains of knowledge.

own work in the production of knowledge. That is, it claims to be a photocopy of reality, but is actually mediated and constructed by scientific tools, post-doctoral researchers, recording devices, drafting of laboratory reports, journal publications, etc.[12] The resulting realization, then, is that both scientific knowledge, and the nature or reality it observes are constructs created by the interaction between various human and non-human actors.

But in making this claim, Latour does not deny the reality of the modernist paradigm of knowledge production. Rather, he notices the transformative properties of the mediation that he describes. Latour asserts that this is a sort of creation. It makes things real, or transforms them from something undetectable or unintelligible into knowledge.[13] Actor-network theory argues that the reality constructed by the modernist paradigm of observation, hypothesization, experimentation, and result is only one type of reality.[14] It suggests, however, that there are many ways in which people, institutions, or things are real. There are multiple ontologies in which one can produce authentic knowledge.[15] What this means is that there is no reality behind constructs, but the constructs themselves produce realities. So, something can be entirely true and legitimate in one ontology, but completely false within another.[16] These constructs work by assembling similar networks to that which Latour observes in laboratory sciences. People, practices, objects, and statements all interact to create a network within which a certain type of knowledge or truth is the only possible legitimate outcome.[17]

Since Latour developed this framework, it has been employed by many others in the sociology of science. But, it has also expanded to fields as wide-ranging as fine art and religion.[18] All of these approaches work in similar ways. They require detailed ethnographic descriptions of interactions between various actors, both human and non-human. Then, they demand reflection and discussion about how these interactions transform or create actors as something else. In so doing, these descriptions reveal a network within which a certain type of knowledge is produced through the translation of one entity into another. Latour calls such

---

[12] Bruno Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 89–90.

[13] Latour, "Thou Shalt Not Freeze-Frame," 36.

[14] Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 116.

[15] Annemarie Mol, "Ontological Politics: A Word and Some Questions," in *Actor-Network Theory and After*, ed. John Law and John Hassard (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 74–89, esp. 77.

[16] Mol, "Ontological," 77–79.

[17] Stephen Muecke, "An Ecology of Institutions: Recomposing the Humanities," *New Literary History* 47 (2016): 231–48, esp. 231–32.

[18] For an example of an actor-network theory approach to art, see Patrice Maniglier, "Art as Fiction: Can Latour's Ontology of Art be Ratified by Art Lovers (An Exercise in Anthropological Diplomacy)," *New Literary History* 47 (2016): 419–38. For a religious application see Barbara Herrnstein Smith, "Anthropotheology: Latour Speaking Religiously," *New Literary History* 47 (2016): 331–51.

Index of Sources

Hebrew Bible

Genesis
1:1–2:4 *258*
17:25 *236*
18:14 *192*
22:1–19 *235*
22:1 232
22:2 234
22:6 *234*
22:9 *235*
22:12 *234*
22:13 234–35, 237–38, *239*
25:22 *192*
38:2 241
38:24 241

Exodus
4:22 111
5:6 *82*
5:10 *82*
5:14 *82*
5:15 *82*
5:19 *82*
12:3–13 *235*
12:7 *235*
12:10 238
13:1–2 251
15:25b 81
16:4b 81
18 *81*
18:13–27 174
18:13–26 81
18:13 161
18:15b 81
18:16b 81
18:19b 81
18:24–26 80
20–23 176
20:5 233, 252, *257*
20:12 *173*
20:22–23:19 231
20:24–26 203
20:24 *232*
21:22 *232*
22:1 183
22:6–14 *192*
22:7–8 192
22:8 *127*
22:10 *127*
22:28–29 205, 250–51
22:28 233, 238, 258, 260
22:28a 251
22:28b 251
22:28c 246, 251
22:29a 251
22:29b 251
22:29c 246, 251
23 177
23:6–8 *80*
23:6 176
23:8 176–77
23:19b *176*
24:5 *234*
29:14 238
29:34 238
32:6 *234*
32:20 238
34:15–16 109
34:26b *176*
36:3 *67*

Leviticus
1:3 232
4:21 238
6:23 *238*
7:17 *238*
7:19 *238*
8:17 *238*
8:32 *238*
9:11 *238*
10:2 240
10:4 *240*
10:16 *238*

13
13:52
13:55
13:57
14
16:27–29
17–26
17:8
18:2a
18:21
18:21a
18:21b
18:21c
18:21d
19:6
20:2–6
20:2–5
20:2a
20:2b
20:2c
20:2d
20:2e
20:2f
20:3
20:4
20:6
20:14
21:9
21:14
22:18–19
25:47

Numbers
5:11–29
9:1–14
11:16
16:35
19
19:5
31:23
35:9–34

Deuteronomy
1
1:5
1:9–18
1:12
1:13–18
1:13
1:15–17
1:15
1:16–18
1:16

184
238
238
238
184, 244
238
240
234
260
243, *246*, 260
246, 260
246, 260
260
260
238
243, 260
260
260
260
260
260
260
260
260
260
161
240
241
105
232
112

241
223
82
240
244
238
242
218

176–77
219
80–81, 152, 161
184
174–75, 177, *194*
174, 177
177
82, 174, 177
80
80, *82*, 146

1:16b
1:17
1:17aαβ
1:20
1:23
1:25
2:6
2:11
2:13
2:27
2:29
3:13
3:20
4:1
4:2
4:2a
4:2b
4:6
4:9
4:15–20
4:19
4:21
4:40
5:1
5:8–9a
5:9
5:16
5:23–27
5:23
5:32
6:2
6:4
6:4a
6:6–8
6:10–11
6:20–25
6:21–22
6:25
7:1–6
7:1–2
7:16
7:18–19
8:12–14
8:13–14
8:14
9:1
10:8–9
10:8
10:12–13
10:17–18
10:18
11:1–4
11:8–9

80
87, 176
176
173
174
173
232
232
232
82, 232
173
174
173
31, *173*
60, 61, 161
59–60
59
177
69
161
213
173
173
69
161
233, 252, *257*
173
161
174
61, 69, 188
69–70
191
173
69
173
71
31
146
218
218
173
31
156
219–20
69, *219*
173
159
174
69
30, 155
87
31
31

11:17 *173*
11:18–19 69
11:29 180
11:31 *173*
12–26 31, 79, 90, 93
12–25 152, 191
12–16 169, 170
12 22, 29, 31, *146*, 203–5, 221, 224
12:1–16:17 144
12:1 61
12:2–26:15 *231*
12:2–16:17 145
12:2–7 145, 204
12:2–4 213
12:4–19 *232*
12:5 31, *174*
12:8–12 204, 209
12:8 224
12:9 *173*
12:10 217
12:11 31, *190*
12:12 31
12:13–19 *232*
12:13–14 204
12:13 *234*
12:14 *174*, *234*
12:15–28 204
12:15 209
12:16 209
12:17–18 173, 204, 209, 224
12:20–28 *232*
12:20 209–10, 217
12:21 *190*, 209–10
12:22 209
12:23–25 209
12:26–27 209
12:29–31 214, 238
12:31 *171*, 229, 232–33, 238–39, 241, 258–59
12:31a 238
12:31b 238
12:31c 238–39
12:31d 238
12:31e 238
12:32 59, 161
13 28, *33*, 154, 171, 221
13:1 59–61, *150*, 154, 161, *171*
13:2–12 32
13:6 189
13:7 33
13:10–11 33
13:10 33, 171
13:13 *173*
13:15 171
13:16 33
14:21 112, 173
14:21b *176*
14:22–29 204
14:23–26 205, 209
14:23–25 *232*
14:23 31, *190*
14:24 *190*, 209
14:27 173
14:29 173
15:2 107
15:3 107
15:4 *173*, 174
15:7 173
15:12–18 205, 224
15:19–23 204
15:19–20 205
15:20 *232*
16–17 202, 205
16:1–17 79, 224, *232*
16:2–15 *190*, *232*
16:5 *173*
16:6 *190*
16:11 173, *190*
16:14 173
16:17 145
16:18–18:22 1, 7–8, 13, 22, 26, 30, 52, 64, *70*, 72, 79, 99, *119*, 120, 137, 143, 145–46, 151–53, 162, *169*, *172*, *195*
16:18–17:13 145, *151*, *169*, 170, 191, 195, 196, *232*
16:18–17:9 191
16:18–20 79–82, 84–85, 90–91, 145–46, 148, 151, 154, 169–71, *178*, *183*, 196, 202, 207, 210–11, 218, 220
16:18 14, 26, 71, 79, *80*, 81, *82*, 83–85, 87, 121, 125–26, 143, 144, 146–48, *150*, 151, 169, 170–79, 191, 193–96, 218
16:18a 145, 152
16:18aβ 179
16:18aαβ 179
16:18bβ 191
16:18b–20 151
16:18b 145–50, 152

16:19–20 14, 71, *80*, 81–82, 145–46, 149, 152, 177–79, *194*
16:19 *80*, *87*, 149, *150*, 154, 171, 175–79, *194*, 212, *220*
16:19a 175–76
16:19b 175
16:19aα 88
16:20–17:8 154
16:20 14, 72–73, 90, 146, 149, *150*, 172–73, 178–79, 191
16:21–18:22 146
16:21–17:13 151–52
16:21–17:7 *80*, *150*, 154
16:21–17:1 80, 153, *154*, 155–56, 170–71
16:21 170
16:22 170
17–18 *64*, 169
17 16, *64–65*, *71*, 74, 126, 132–33, *179*, 214
17:1 170
17:2–7 80, 153, 155, 170–71, 189
17:2 14, *173*
17:4 132, 171
17:5 156, 170
17:6 170, *186*
17:7 171, 189
17:8–13 15, 80, 85, *126*, 133, *150*, 153–55, 157, 169–71, 179, *183*, 190, *193*, 196, 202, 210–11, 216, *217*, 218–19
17:8–10a *188*
17:8–9 29, 186–89, *190*, 191, 193–96
17:8 *80*, 85, *87*, 130, 169–71, *177*, 179–80, 183–84, *186*, 187, 191–92, 210, *232*
17:8a 184
17:8aα_2 *184*, 185
17:8b 156, 187
17:9–13 85
17:9–11 *87*
17:9 *80*, 130, *150*, 153, 157, 160, 181–82, *183*, 185–86, *189*, 191, *192*, 193, 218
17:9aα 186
17:9aβγ 181, 185
17:9b *187*, 189
17:10–13 186
17:10–12 101
17:10–11 210
17:10 169, 186–90, *232*
17:10a 186, *187*
17:10b 186, *187–188*
17:10b–13 *190*
17:11 61, 157, 188–89
17:11b 188
17:12–13 189–90
17:12 *80*, 155, 160, 181–82, *183*, 185–86, 188–89, *190*, 210
17:12bα 189
17:12bβ 189, *190*
17:13 151, 188–89, *190*
17:14–18:22 *151*
17:14–20 23, 26, 49, 64, *65*, *68*, *70*, 84, 99–100, 102–4, 119, 144, 151, 155–57, 178–79, 201, 219, *222*
17:14–18 103
17:14–17 *143*, *222*
17:14–15 207, 212, 214
17:14–15a 208
17:14 14, 107, 144, 160, 172, *173*, 213–17, *218*
17:15 16, *65*, 70–71, 74, 101, 106–7, *205*, 206–7, 215
17:15b–17 156
17:15b–16 108
17:16–17 201, 206, 210, *220*
17:16 101, *113*, *151*, 207
17:17–20 219–20
17:17–19 109
17:17 101, *103*, 207, 219
17:17aβ *188*
17:18–20 15–16, 156, 207
17:18–19 29, 101, 202, 206, 211, 219–20
17:18–19a 210
17:18 67–68, 72, 104, *105*, 157, 160, 185–86, 211
17:19–20 16, 103, *106*
17:19 69, 73, 101, 206, 212
17:19aα 68
17:19aβ 68
17:19b 210
17:20 61, 69, 74, 101, 105–6, 109, *113*, 207, 219, 221
17:20a 69, 103

17:20b 69, 103
17:20c 70
18–19 13
18 16, *64*, 133
18:1–8 31, 151, 155, 157, 159, 169, 218
18:1 144, 158–60, *174*, 185–86
18:1a 158–59
18:1b 158–59
18:2 159–60
18:3–8 159
18:3–5 159, *160*
18:3 *87*, 185–86
18:3b *189*
18:5 *159*, *174*, 189
18:6–8 159, *160*
18:6–7 29
18:6 169, 173, *232*
18:7–8 15
18:7 *159*
18:7a *189*
18:8 159
18:9 14, 144, 160, 172, *173*, 214, *218*, *241*
18:9–22 151, 160–61
18:9–20 218
18:9–14 161
18:10–11 229, 232–33, 241, *242*, 249, 258
18:10 238, 259
18:10a 241
18:10b 241
18:10c 241
18:10d 241
18:11 *192*
18:11a 241
18:11b 242
18:11c 242
18:14 214
18:15–22 16, 223
18:15–18 *160*
18:15 13, 160
18:16–20 161
18:18–19 16
18:18 16
18:19 101
18:20–22 16
18:20 *189*
18:22 16, 151, *189*
19 132
19:1–13 *169*, 205, 224
19:1–7 217
19:1 *173*
19:2 *173*
19:6 *87*, 147
19:8–10 210, 217
19:8 217
19:10 *173*, 183
19:13 189
19:14 *169*, *173*
19:15–21 *169*
19:15 130, 170, *186*
19:16–21 *127*
19:17–18 *80*
19:17 132, 182, *184*, 185–86
19:17a *185*
19:17b 185
19:18 132
19:18b–19a *192*
19:19 189
19:19a *192*
20:1–2 *29*
20:5 *82*
20:8 *82*
20:9 *82*, 212
20:16 *173*
21:1–9 183–84
21:1–6 84
21:1 *173*
21:2 *80*
21:5 183, *184*
21:5b 184
21:7 90
21:9 189
21:17 *87*
21:21 189
21:22 *87*, 147
21:23 *173*
22:8 183
22:13–21 *130*
22:21 189
22:22 189
22:24 189
22:25 *189*
23:17 173
23:21 107
24:4 *173*
24:7 189
24:8 184–86
24:13 146
24:14 173
24:17 *87*
24:19–22 112
25:1 *80*, *82*, *87*, *184*
25:11 *232*

25:15 *82*, 148, *173*
25:19 *173*
26:1–11 112
26:1 *173*, *218*
26:2 *173*, *190*, *232*
26:3 *182*, 185
27:2 *173*
27:3 *173*
27:4 180
27:6 232
27:9 185
27:12 180
28:2–68 256
28:8 *173*
28:14 61, 69
28:31 67
28:58 *113*
28:68 *113*
28:69 *257*
29:9 *82*, *174*
29:10 *82*
29:19 *87*
29:20 *174*
30:11 *192*
30:15–16 31
30:19 259
31 71, 74
31:9–13 49, 188
31:9–10 70
31:9 72
31:11 70
31:12 69
31:25–26 72
31:28 *82*, *174*
32:4 *87*
32:6 *177*
32:41 *87*
33:5 *174*
33:19 *82*, 148

Joshua
1:10 *82*
1:11 *173*
1:15 *173*
3:2 *82*
3:3 185
5:10–12 *223*
6:26–27 250
6:26 233
6:26c 250
6:26d 250
8:33 *82*, 185
23:2 *82*
24:1 *82*
24:13 173

Judges
3:1 *182*
4:4 *182*
4:5 182
10:1–3 182
10:2–3 *182*
11:1–40 236
11:31 232, 236, 238
12:7–14 182
12:7–9 *182*
12:11 *182*
12:13–14 *182*
16:31 *182*
17:6 *156*, 219
18:1 *156*
19:1–20 *234*
19:1 *156*
21:25 *156*, 219, *235*

1 Samuel
1:11 239, *251*
1:27–28 *239*
7:15 182
8–12 144
8 *156*, *179*, 206, 214–15, 221, *222*
8:1–5 219
8:1–3 178, 179
8:1 182
8:5 182
8:9–18 *64*
8:20 182, 212, 215
9:9 *192*
10:25 *64*
12 *222*
17:28 *189*
28:7 *192*
30:7–8 *161*

2 Samuel
1:26 *192*
7 111
12:1–14 *156*
12:1–2 233
12:13–15 252
12:13–14 *252*
14:1–24 *156*
15:2–6 183
19:8 183

1 Kings
3:16–28 *156*, 183
3:28 *87*
9:26–11:10 *222*
9:26–10:25 *222*
9:28 109
10 109
10:26–29 108, *222*
11:1–10 *222*
11:1–8 109
11:3–9 222
14:5 *193*
16:24 233
16:34 250
16:34a 250
16:34b 250
16:34c 250
16:34d 250
16:34e 250
16:34f 250
22:8 *192*

2 Kings
1:3 *192*
3:11 *192*
3:26 *237*
3:27 232, 237–38
6:24–30 230
11:12 64
12:11 *180*
16:2–3a *243*
16:3b 243
16:3c 243
17:1–18 249
17:1–2 244
17:4 245
17:6 245
17:15 245
17:17 245, 249
18:1–3 *243*
19:14 *180*
20:8 *180*
21:1–9 206
21:6 243, 249
22–23 54, *71*, *101*
22:1–2 206
23:2–3 70
23:2 *180*
23:10 244
23:10a 244
23:10b 244
23:10c 244
23:10d 244
23:11–15 244
23:25 *244*

1 Chronicles
9:2 185
23:4 *82*
26:29 *82*
27:1 *82*

2 Chronicles
5:5 185
19:5–11 211
19:5 211
19:6–7 211
19:8 211
19:10 211
19:11 *82*
23:18 185
26:11 82
30:27 185
33:6 *243*
33:11–13 243
34:13 *82*

Ezra
10:5 185

Nehemiah
10:29 185
10:35 185
11:20 185

Isaiah
8:19 161, *192*
40:21–23 36
43:15–21 36
44:4–8 36
51:1 179
58:2 *148*

Jeremiah 63
5:28 *87*
7:31 239, 241
19:5 *239*, 240–41
22:16 183
26:10 *180*
26:11 147
26:16 147
32:17 *192*
32:35 *239*, *243*
49:16 *189*
50:31 *189*
50:32 *189*

Lamentations
3:59 *87*

Job
42:3 *192*

Psalms
2:7–8 110
45:7 *110*
82 36
82:6–7 36
89:15 149
95:3 31
96:10 36
97 *195*
97:1 36
97:2 149, 195
97:6 195
98 *195*
98:6 36
98:9 195
99:1 36
119:7 *148*
119:62 *148*
119:106 *148*
119:160 148
119:164 *148*
131:1 *192*

Proverbs
2:9 149
6:7 82
11:2 *189*
13:10 *189*
16:3a 195
20:8 183
21:24 *189*
24:23 *177*
25:5 195
28:21 *177*
30:18 *192*

Ecclesiastes
5:7 149

Ezekiel
7:10 *189*
7:23 147
12:3 247
12:4 247
12:7 247
12:11 247
16:6 247
16:8 247
16:15–22 248
16:15–21 248
16:15 247
16:17–21 *248*
16:17 *248*
16:20 233
16:20a *233*, 246
16:20b 246
16:20c 246
16:20d 246
16:20e 246, 248
16:21a 246
16:21b 246–47
16:25 247
16:36 248
16:38 *87*
18:8 *87*, 147
20:26 *239*, 247
20:26a 247
20:26b 247
20:26c 247
20:26d 247
20:31 *239*, 247
20:31a 248
20:31b 248
20:31c 248
20:31d 248
20:31e 248
20:31f 248
20:31g 248
20:31h 248
20:49 245
21:5 245
25:3 247
43:19 185
44:15 185

Daniel
3:1–30 242
3:27 *242*

Obadiah
1:3 *189*

Micah
6:6–7 252
6:6a 252
6:6b 252
6:6c 252
6:6d 252
6:7 233, *257*
6:7a 252

6:7b 252
6:7c 252
6:7d 252

Zechariah
7:9 87
8:16 87, 147

Revelation
22:18–19 61

Rabbinic Literature

Mishnah Sanhedrin
2:4 *68*

Mishnah Soṭah
7:8 70

Sifre Deuteronomy
156.2 212, 214
158.1 212
159.2 212
161.1 212

Dead Sea Scrolls

Rule of the Community (1QS) 63
11Q19 175
LI, 11–12 *175*
LI, 11–18 81
LVI, 5 *190*
LVI, 12–21 103–4, 211
LVI, 12–14 211
LVI, 14–15 106
LVI, 16 *103*
LVI, 18–19 *103*
LVI, 20 67
LVI, 20–21 104
LVII, 3–5 212
LVII, 11–17 105
LVII, 11–13 106
LVII, 14 103, 106, 211
LVII, 15–17 105
LVII, 19–21 *220*
LVIII, 3–21 212
LVIII, 3–11 212
LVIII, 12–13 212
LVIII, 15–17 212
LVIII, 18–21 212
LIX, 19–20 212
LIX, 21 103

Apocrypha

Genizah Psalms
4:20 147

Sirach
38:10 *177*
42:21 *58*

Ancient Near Eastern Texts

Akk,50 *123*, 132

Babylonian Chronicle
BM 92502 *244*
BM 114470 135

Dedication of a Son and Heir to Sîn 257

Dedication of an Eldest Daughter 257

EA
9 *107*
11 *107*

Erra and Ishum
V. 43b–44 61

HL
§ 173a *91*

Nabonidus
1113 124
9.III.17 128–29
20.V. 12 129

SAA 10 114 *134*

Sacrifice of the Son and Heir or Eldest Daughter to Bēlit-ṣeri 257

Samsuiluna 6.XII.12 128

TIM
4 34 *128*

YOS
6 203 128
7 31 132
7 71 *135*
7 137 131
7 161 *123*
7 189 *125*

Hittite

CTH
259 § 14 194
261.1 § 39' 194
379 § 8' (ii 7'–17') 61

Ugaritic

Kirta (*COS* 1.102:333) 110

Greek & Roman Authors

Andocides

On the Mysteries
87 *88*

Aristotle

Politics
VII.8 1322a9 *88*

Constitution of Athens
16.5 85

Demosthenes

Against Meidias
21.94 86

Diodorus Siculus
1.75.6 86

Homer

Odyssey
8.163 *83*
21.95 *83*

Josephus

Against Apion
2.175–178 73

Antiquities
IV.194 *12*
IV.302 *143*

Philo

On the Special Laws
4.160 67

Greek Inscriptions*

IC I. xviii 3 91
IC IV. 21 93
IC IV. 42 B12–13 92
IC IV. 72 XII.6–19 92

IC IV. 82 *93*
IC IV. 106 *91*
IC IV. 41.4 *91*
IC IV. 42B *91*
IC IV. 45B *91*
IC IV. 67B *91*
IC IV. 72 *91*
IC IV. 72 I.11–12 *91*
IC IV. 72 I.13 *91*
IC IV. 72 I.23 *91*
IC IV. 72 I.36 *91*
IC IV. 72 I.38–39 *91*
IC IV. 72 II.55 *91*
IC IV. 72 III.15 *91*
IC IV. 72 IX.21 *91*
IC IV. 72 IX.29–30 *91*
IC IV. 72 IX.32 *91*
IC IV. 72 V.31–32 *91*
IC IV. 72 V.35–36 *91*
IC IV. 72 V.42–43 *91*
IC IV. 72 VI.30 *91*
IC IV. 72 VI.53–54 *91*
IC IV. 72 VII.45 *91*
IC IV. 72 XI.26 *91*
IC IV. 72 XI.26–31 87
IC IV. 72 XI.46–55 *83*
IC IV. 72 XI.47 *91*
IC IV. 72 XI.49–50 *91*
IC IV. 72 XI.52 *91*
IC IV. 75D *91*
IG XII/2. 526 89
Nomina I.19 = ML 32 83
Nomina I.43 = ML 20 92, *93*
Nomina I.62 92
Nomina I.78 = *SEG* 30.380 *83*
Nomina I.81 91
Nomina II.80 91
Nomina II.84 = *IC* IV 22b 88
SEG 29.1130*bis* 89–90

Index of Names

Agamben, Giorgio 34–35
Alter, Robert *205*
Amar, Akhil Reed 74
Assmann, Jan 27, 33, 38, 40

Barr, James 33
Benjamin, Walter 34, 35
Bennett, Harold 113
Berman, Joshua 25–26, 28, 39, 60, 62, 69–72
Bourdieu, Pierre 11
Bretherton, Luke 65–66, 74
Brettler, Marc *222*
Brueggemann, Walter 74–75

Carrière, Jean-Marie 99–101, 107, 108
Crüsemann, Frank 29

Day, Peggy 246–47
Démare-Lafont, Sophie 90–91, *129*, *231*

Eagleton, Terry 21–22

Fraade, Steven 71–72, 101, *103*, 105, 107
Fuhs, H. F. 247

Gertz, Jan Christian 183, *192*
Glanville, Mark 112
Goswell, Gregory *119*
Gottwald, Norman 41, *64*
Grabbe, Lester 215
Greenberg, Moshe 33

Hagedorn, Anselm C. 29
Hall, Jonathan M. 100
Hanson, Paul D. *74*
Hennion, Antoine 11
Hilbert, Richard A. 138
Hoffner, Harry A. 37

Jameson, Frederick 36

Keller, Catherine 35
Kleber, Kristin *134*, 135–36
Knapp, Andrew 37
Knoppers, Gary N. 221
Koester, Craig R. *61–62*

Landes, Richard 25
Latour, Bruno 9, 10, 12
Levenson, Jon 235
Levinson, Bernard 24–25, 52–54, *60*, *70–71*, 72, 101–2, *119*, 120, *121*, *127*, 137, *171*, 231–32, 258–59
Liverani, Mario 254
Lohfink, Norbert 23–24, 102, 107
Lundbom, Jack 146

McBride, S. Dean 24–25
McConville, J. Gordon 26, 40, 146
McNutt, Paula *65*
Müller, Reinhard 82, *164*

Nelson, Eric *143*
Nelson, Richard 146

Odell, Margaret 248
Oswald, Wolfgang *138*
Otto, Eckart 32–33, *121*, *126–127*, *132–33*, 146, *151*, *192*

Patrick, Dale 215

Radner, Karen 257–58
Rasch, William 28
Richter, Sandra L. *119*
Robson, James 60
Rofé, Alexander *150*, *172*
Ruane, Nicole 236–37
Rütersworden, Udo *126*

Sandowicz, Małgorzata 124–25
Samuel, Harald *177*
Schenker, Adrian 179–80
Schiffman, Lawrence H. *103*, 105
Schmitt, Carl 34–35
Smith, Barbara Herrnstein 13

Tarasewicz, Radosław 124–25
Tigay, Jeffrey 61, 239, 242

Voegelin, Eric 1, 4
Vogt, Peter 39–40

Walton, John 31–32
Wazana, Nili *119*
Weber, Max 137, 138
Weinfeld, Moshe 163, 194
Wellhausen, Julius 154
Wills, Gary 50–55

Zakovitch, Yair 232

Index of Subjects

Actor-network theory 9–12
Adoption 111
Amendable legislation 56–57
Amendable legislation *see also* amendment 58–59
Amendable legislation *see also* revision(ism) 49, 54
Apšu, the town of 124–25

Central court, *see* cultic centralization
Correct decision(s) 162
Cultic centralization 126, 127, 130, 132–133, 138, *153*, 155, 203–4

Deuteronomy 21–22, 25
– as constitution 73, 120, 143
– as politics 22
– canonical formula of ~ 58, 61–62
– constitutional passage of ~ 7–9, 13–17, 24, 64, 79, 99, 100, 102, 143
– ideal of prophecy 161
– rejection of child sacrifice 229–30
– rhetoric of ~ 54, 57
– the death penalty in ~ 126, 130
– theoretical political structure 126
Divine presence / presence of YHWH 8–9, 13–17

Egalitarianism 25, 28
Emolument Clause 202–3
Ethnicity theory 99–100, 107–8, 114

gēr (sojourner) 111–14
Government
– constitutional 25
– democracy 26, 29–30
Government official(s) 8, 14, 22, 29, 100, 144, 151
– "court recorder" 162
– judges 81–82, 87–88, 90–91, 93, 121–25, 152–55, 219
– king 16, 26–27, *29*, 67–71, 74, 91, 101, 119, 155–57
– priest 67–68, 105–6, 153, 192
– *see also* Levites
– prophet 16, 133–34, 160–61

Heremeneutic of legal innovation 231, 258
Hermeneutic of dissent 230, 259

Justice 4, 14–15, 163–64

Law
– Athenian *88*
– constitutional 1, *24*, 26, 53, 73–74, 143, 151–52
– functionalist model of ~ 85
– of Offices *see* Deuteronomy, constitutional passage of
– of the King 66, 69, 84, 90–114, 120, 156, 178–79, 201, 206, 220, 225
– of YHWH 24, 29
– Rule of ~ 25–26, 28, 30, 81
– statutory 62
Levites 15, 29, 157–60
– *see also* priest

Mnemomens 83–84
Model Israelite *see also* Israelite identity 107–11, 114
Molech Sacrifice *243*, 244, 260

Neo-Assyrian administrative system 122–23, 253–57, 259
Neo-Assyrian imperial laws 32, 230, 258
Neo-Babylonian administrative system 120, 125, 128–30, 134–36
nokrî (foreigner) 111–14

Politics/political 65
– philosophy 99–102, 113
– power and separation of power 7–8, 17, 24–26, 29, 94, 151–52
– criticism 21
– ~ of Reading 38, 41
– reading 21
– theology 65–66, 70
Professionalization 84, 92

Regimes of truth 11–13, 16
Religious speech 12
Royal apologetic 36–37

Secular slaughter 208–9
Social justice 145, 149–50, 163
Supersessionist 54, 62

Two-Witness Rule 126–130

Urdeuteronomium 169–70, 185, 193, 195–96

YHWH
– as King 31–32, 34–36, *70*
– sovereignty 30, 35–36