

Pathos und Polis

Herausgegeben von
Viktoria Rächle, Sven Page
und Vibeke Goldbeck



Emotions in Antiquity 3



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Einsatz und Wirkung von Emotionen
im klassischen Griechenland

Herausgegeben von
Viktoria Rächle, Sven Page
und Vibeke Goldbeck

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Vorwort

Der vorliegende Band ist aus der internationalen Tagung „Pathos & Polis. Einsatz und Wirkung affektiver Elemente in der griechischen Welt“ entstanden, zu der sich im Oktober 2017 an der Freien Universität Berlin Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler verschiedener Fachrichtungen versammelten, um die Rolle von Emotionen im antiken Griechenland zu beleuchten. Von Pathos erfüllt möchten wir am Ende des Projektes unsere Dankbarkeit allen Mitwirkenden gegenüber zum Ausdruck bringen, sie trugen mit ihren Vorträgen, Gedankenexperimenten und intensiven Diskussionen zum Gelingen der Veranstaltung bei. Der Erfolg bemisst sich nicht allein nach rein wissenschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten, auch die soziale Komponente des Symposiums ist gerade aus gegenwärtig pandemisch-virtueller Sicht besonders hoch zu preisen. Der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) und dem Deutschen Archäologenverband (DArV) sei daher sehr herzlich für die finanzielle Unterstützung gedankt.

Da sich bereits im Zuge der Konferenz ein deutlicher Schwerpunkt auf das klassische Athen abzeichnete, beschlossen wir für die Herausgabe dieses Bandes, unsere Fragestellung auf den Umgang mit Emotionen und Affekten in der griechischen Gesellschaft des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. zu fokussieren. Mit dieser Zuspitzung hoffen wir, unseren Teil dazu beigetragen zu haben, das Bild von der Klassik als Zeitalter der Selbstkontrolle und Emotionsarmut zu korrigieren und dem Pathos seinen angestammten Platz in der Polis zurückzugeben.

Dass die Beiträge nun in gedruckter Form erscheinen, ist dem Verlag Mohr Siebeck und dem Herausgabeteam der Schriftenreihe *Emotions in Antiquity* zu verdanken. Douglas Cairns und die anonyme Autorität hinter der Peer Review trugen reinigend zur Qualität des Bandes bei. Anerkennung gebührt ferner den Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern im Verlag Mohr Siebeck, allen voran Tobias Stäbler und Rebekka Zech, für ihre fachkundigen Antworten auf all unsere Fragen, sie bewahrten die Texte vor inhaltlichen und formalen Ungereimtheiten. Bei der Endredaktion des Bandes wachten schließlich die Argusaugen von Amelie Lutz über jede Zeile. Alle verbleibenden Unzulänglichkeiten liegen in unserer Verantwortung, und so schicken wir unser Buch nun hoffnungsvoll auf die Reise zu seiner Leserschaft.

Die Herausgeber
Viktoria Räuchle, Sven Page und Vibeke Goldbeck

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Introduction

Viktoria Rächle

Un poco con la cabeza de Maradona
y otro poco con la mano de Dios.
– A little with the head of Maradona
and a little with the hand of God.¹

With this ingenious one-liner, the divine, alas not immortal, football player Diego Maradona described his infamous first goal in the 1986 World Cup quarterfinal between Argentina and England – a goal which would not only secure their entry in the semi-final but ultimately their victory of the tournament. In football, as in other areas of politics, there is not always an objective truth: camera footage soon afterwards clarified that the Hand of God had manifested quite physically in the hand of Diego. But for the Argentinians, the supernatural intervention remained beyond doubt.² There was a lot at stake that day in the Estadio Azteca in Mexico City. This was not just a match, it was a show-down of unprecedented political dimension: four years earlier, Argentina had experienced a devastating defeat against the United Kingdom in the Falklands War – the triumph on the turf was therefore ‘an act of symbolic revenge’.³ For better or worse, the manoeuvre provoked an outburst of emotions unrivalled in football history. When the Hand of God recently departed the earthly sphere, amidst a devastating economic crisis in Argentina and the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, emotions were stirred up anew: Maradona’s home country declared three days of national mourning while

¹ Diego Maradona in the press conference after the quarterfinals against England, Estadio Azteca, Mexico City, 22 June 1986; see WHITE 2014, 138–41.

² WHITE 2014, 138–9: ‘Across Argentina the nation was united in the belief that what unfolded in Mexico City that day was the working of divine providence. Sure, Maradona’s actions might not have been strictly within the rules of the game, but the fact that their talisman got away with it suggested to his countrymen that someone up there was smiling down on them and their football team.’

³ In the 2019 documentary by Asif Kapadia, Diego Maradona himself draws the connection to the Falklands War, cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_hand_of_God (23 November 2020): ‘The hype made it seem like we were going to play out another war. I knew it was my hand. It wasn’t my plan but the action happened so fast that the linesman didn’t see me putting my hand in. The referee looked at me and he said: “Goal”. It was a nice feeling like some sort of symbolic revenge against the English.’

fans all over the globe grieved the loss of their D10S, the ‘broker of emotions’,⁴ the ‘most human of the Gods’.⁵

Despite the long and successful history of alternative facts and emotionalized reasoning, the phenomenon has witnessed a spike in interest since 2016, when Oxford Dictionaries chose the concept of ‘post-truth’ as the Word of the Year and defined it as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’.⁶ Various political events and social developments in the US and in Europe, such as the American presidential election of 2016 and the subsequent victory of Donald J. Trump or the rise of right-wing parties across Europe, created the impression that we were on the verge of a ‘post-truth era’.⁷ Certainly, the role of emotions in modern public discourse should not be underestimated – but this is by no means a new development: ‘We are all post-truthers and probably always have been.’⁸

The ancient Greeks were well aware of the power of *pathos* in shaping and controlling public discourse. Rhetorical treatises and theories from the fifth century BC onwards display considerable efforts to systematize the pragmatics of emotion with regard to social control and decision-making. Aristotle’s doctrine of the three rhetorical appeals – *logos*, *ēthos*, and *pathos* – is just one of many similar accounts that discuss the effect of affect.⁹ Persuasion has never rested on ‘facts’ or ‘truth’ alone. Plutarch documents this with an anecdote about Pericles, the

⁴ Marcela Mora y Araujo for *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2020/nov/25/diego-maradona-the-achingly-human-superstar-who-embodied-argentina> (26 November 2020).

⁵ The *New York Times* quoting Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/25/sports/soccer/maradona-death-photos.html> (26 November 2020).

⁶ Oxford Languages, <https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/> (23 November 2020). In the same year, the *Gesellschaft für Deutsche Sprache* (Society for German Language) elected the term ‘postfaktisch’ (‘post-factual’) as the word of the year, <https://gfd.s.de/wort-des-jahres-2016/> (23 November 2020).

⁷ For a critical review of ‘post-truth’ as a general characteristic of our age see: FARKAS 2020.

⁸ Toby Young for *The Spectator*, <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-truth-about-post-truth-politics> (23 November 2020).

⁹ Arist. *Rh.* 1356a1–25: (3) τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστειων τρία εἶδη ἔστιν: αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἦθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι ... (7) ἐπεὶ δ’ αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ, φανερόν ἐστι ταύτας ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἦθη καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται – (3) Now, the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, insofar as it proves or seems to prove ... (7) Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions – the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is produced.’ (trans. FRIESE).

man who governed the fate of the Athenians over several decades in the second half of the fifth century BC:

There is on record also a certain saying of Thucydides, the son of Melesias, touching the clever persuasiveness of Pericles, a saying uttered in jest. Thucydides belonged to the party of the 'Good and True', and was for a very long time a political antagonist of Pericles. When Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, asked him whether he or Pericles was the better wrestler, he replied: 'Whenever I throw him in wrestling, he disputes the fall, and carries his point, and persuades the very men who saw him fall.'¹⁰

Pericles knew how to turn defeat into victory with the help of *peithō*: according to the Athenian poet Eupolis, 'persuasion of sorts perched upon his lips. That's how he could cast a spell, and he alone of the speakers left a sting in his audience.'¹¹ There are numerous testimonies and anecdotes to confirm that the power of *pathos* was just as important for the destinies of a Classical *polis* as hard facts and compelling arguments. Hardly any historical personality dominated the political stage by mere reason, hardly any orator won over their audience without rhetorical tricks and emotionally charged interludias.¹² Yet, skilful play with affects and moods is by no means limited to the realm of orators and politicians but can be found in various areas of communication and interaction throughout Greek antiquity: from sentimental epitaphs to incendiary speeches in the written accounts, from subtle gestures to distorted faces in the visual arts, or from silent attunement to passionate excess in the context of ritual.

In the last couple of decades, the field of emotion history has exploded within the Humanities in general and, in particular, the Classics and has brought forth a flood of studies focusing on various aspects of the emotional life in antiquity.¹³ Surprisingly though, a systematic study of the role of emotions within

¹⁰ Plut. *Vit. Per.* 8,4: Διαμνημονεύεται δέ τις καὶ Θουκυδίδου τοῦ Μελησίου λόγος εἰς τὴν δεινότητα τοῦ Περικλέους μετὰ παιδιᾶς εἰρημένος. ἦν μὲν γὰρ ὁ Θουκυδίδης τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ πλεῖστον ἀντεπολιτεύσατο τῷ Περικλεῖ χρόνον· Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως πυνθανομένου πότερον αὐτὸς ἢ Περικλῆς παλαίει βέλτιον, "Ὅταν," εἶπεν, "ἐγὼ καταβάλλω παλαίων, ἐκεῖνος ἀντιλέγων ὡς οὐ πέπτωκε, νικᾷ καὶ μεταπίθεται τοὺς ὀρώντας," (trans. PERRIN).

¹¹ Eur. PCG 102: πειθῶ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν, οὕτως ἐκίλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις. (trans. STOREY). – On the metaphorical significance of the *kentron* see RÄUCHLE in this volume, 81; BUIS in this volume, 196–7.

¹² On the role of emotions in ancient Greek and Roman rhetoric see most recently (with further references): SANDERS and JOHNCOCK 2016; cf. KONSTAN 2010b.

¹³ For a thorough and fairly current research overview on emotions in the Classics see CAIRNS and NELIS 2017b. Further (very selected) reading: ancient definitions and theories: KONSTAN 2006; KRAJCZYNSKI and RAPP 2009. – Current methods and approaches: LACOURSE MUNTEANU 2011; CHANIOTIS 2012; CAIRNS and NELIS 2017a. – Case studies of individual emotions: KONSTAN 1994 (love); KONSTAN 1997 (friendship). KONSTAN 2001 (pity); KONSTAN 2010a (forgiveness); KONSTAN et al. 2011 (horror, hate, love, grief); LATEINER and SPATHARAS 2017a (disgust). Emotions in particular contexts and settings: CHANIOTIS 2011; CAIRNS and FULKERSON 2015; CHANIOTIS and DUCREY 2013; CAIRNS 2019.

the cultural fabric of the Classical era remains a desideratum. One of the reasons might be the dominant paradigm to explain the success of Classical Greek *polis*-societies with the ideal of *sōphrosynē*, self-restraint, hence the alleged opposite of emotionality.¹⁴ Many traditional socio-historical interpretations are based on the assumption that the stability of social and political institutions is first and foremost ensured by a rigorous enforcement of collective norms and ideals, which almost automatically leads to emotional control in individual members of the community.¹⁵

Without a doubt, the ideal of *sōphrosynē* was one of the driving forces of the *polis* community. But the omnipresent glorification of self-restraint in contemporary sources should not blind us to the fact that ancient public discourses were often laden with *pathos*. Even in the highly controlled city of Athens, the targeted activation of emotions played a key role in all sorts of social communication and decision-making. In this context, it is important to differentiate between individual emotions, often suspected of counteracting the common interest, and collective emotions, which could serve as an element of cohesion within a group (e.g. the *polis*) and thus as a crucial instrument in the construction of a collective identity.¹⁶ Both in public and private affairs, emotions can be regarded as an integral part of ancient ethics as they guide normative behaviours and practical judgements.¹⁷ Finally, emotionality is not necessarily equal to hyperemotionality and/or a lack of restraint. A one-dimensional understanding of emotions as automatically excessive and uncontrolled is misleading as it ignores the so-called inhibitive emotions such as shame (*aidōs*), which are foundational pillars of emotion management.¹⁸ The sources clearly suggest that the ancient Greek ideal of *sōphrosynē* is not conceivable without the targeted activation and controlled experience of these moderating emotions. Instead of adhering to the traditional dichotomy between reason and emotions, then, it seems more promising to differentiate between good and bad emotions, i.e. collective and individual, social and self-interested, or moderate and excessive.

¹⁴ On the concept of *sōphrosynē* see NORTH 1966; RADEMAKER 2005.

¹⁵ One of the main objectives of the ideal of self-restraint was the prevention of overly excessive forms of emotional decision-making in jurisdiction; it can thus be described as the final stage in a long discourse on how to control rage, vigilant justice, and their, at times, catastrophic consequences within a community. HARRIS 2001; on ancient anger see also BRAUND and MOST 2004.

¹⁶ See e.g. the phenomenon of *effervescence collective* in ritual settings described by DURKHEIM 1912, 312, or the concept of *emotional communities* by ROSENWEIN 2006.

¹⁷ The normative function of emotions is not restricted to the so-called social emotions but even applies to the most basic emotions such as disgust, cf. LATEINER and SPATHARAS 2017b.

¹⁸ For a comprehensive study on the emotion of *aidōs* and 'the psychology and ethics of honour and shame in ancient Greek literature', see CAIRNS 1993.

1. The Volume

This volume emerged from the international conference “Pathos & Polis. The Pragmatics of Emotions in Ancient Greece”, held in October 2017 at the Freie Universität Berlin, and sets out to rid the emotions from their unwarranted reputation as destructive forces in ancient society and culture. The focus on the Athenian *polis* of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, although not originally envisioned, turned out to be a particularly effective way to study the manifold roles of emotions in ancient societies from an interdisciplinary perspective, without compromising the coherence of the overall endeavour. The Classical Athenian culture, with its abundance of literary, visual, and material sources, with its excellent research status, and not least with its strong legacy on our own culture, constitutes an ideal context to study the pragmatics of emotion ‘under laboratory conditions’.

By bringing together contributions from Philology, Ancient History, and Classical Archaeology, this volume covers a wide spectrum of sources as well as methodological and theoretical approaches, and thus seeks to highlight the richness of aesthetic, rhetorical, and performative means that contributed to the ‘theatre of *pathos*’ in the Classical polis. Depending on the respective material basis and research objective, the chapters focus on the following three main perspectives:

1) Representation of emotions: The identification and analysis of the specific modes of conveying *pathē* and other affective phenomena in different media and contexts constitutes the *conditio sine qua non* for any advanced study of the role of emotions in their broader socio-cultural environment. As the contributions by RÄUCHLE, KREWET, and BUIS clearly show, the display of emotion is not simply a matter of artistic convention but heavily influenced by contemporary emotion concepts, feeling norms, and display rules. Therefore, the analysis of emotion representation is not a mere prolegomenon but in itself provides vital information on the status and significance of affective phenomena in the society and/or culture under consideration.

2) Elicitation of emotions: The chapters by GANTER, MEYER, KREWET, PAGE, MICHELS, and MÜLLER elaborate on the specific ‘rhetorical’ strategies implemented in various public settings such as rituals, theatrical performances, images, and public speeches to create an emotional reaction in the audience. Again, the reconstruction of these emotive strategies is not only a prerequisite for studying the calculated use of affect in the public discourse but has a historical dimension in its own right as it provides an overview of collective emotions as well as the specific conditions and dynamics of their activation.

3) Social and political role of emotions: A third perspective is primarily directed towards the concrete operational areas of emotions and affective phenomena in Greek societies of the Classical era. The chapters concerned with this issue

trace the manifold roles of *pathē* in various fields of social interaction, e.g. as catalysts for group cohesion among the citizen body (KONSTAN, GANTER), as beacons to navigate in the depths of ancient feeling rules (RÄUCHLE, KREWET), as a means to persuade the audience in the political or legal domain (PAGE, MICHELS, MÜLLER, KÜNZER), or as a tool to criticize power structures and cultural traditions (BUIS).

Across these three perspectives, all contributions are united in the common goal to illuminate the significance of emotions in the fabric of society. As the following paragraph will show, certain emotional concepts – such as *philia* ('love' or 'friendship'), *aidōs* ('shame' or 'shamefulness'), *orgē* ('rage') – reappear throughout the volume in all kinds of media and social contexts, thus confirming not only their own relevance within the cultural discourse of the time but also the necessity of a comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach.

2. The Chapters

The first section ('I. Emotion und Kohäsion') deals with the role of emotions in ancient Greek *polis* structures as a means to foster collective identity. David KONSTAN's chapter on 'Love and Reciprocity' opens the debate by identifying *philia* among fellow citizens as the decisive relationship structure that created and sustained a sense of solidarity in ancient city-states. Starting from Paul Woodruff's somewhat bewildered assessment that the ancient Greeks lacked a concept similar to loyalty, he elaborates on the notions of 'love' in the civic realm and concludes that 'as an ideology the role of *pathos* seems to have been every bit as effective as appeals to solidarity and the ideal of *semper fidelis*'.¹⁹ For him, the main reason for the astonishing binding power of ancient *philia*, in the sense of mutual goodwill within the group, is that it combines rational and emotional elements.

Angela GANTER expands on the subject of emotion and group cohesion in cultic settings: taking the (fiercely debated) Athenian festival of the *Anthesteria* as a case study, she critically assesses the possibilities and limits of reconstructing the emotional experiences of past cultures and societies. While previous research often introduced the emotive effect of rituals as an axiomatic premise without further scrutinizing,²⁰ GANTER places the issue of emotivity itself at the centre of her study. After a thorough re-examination of the scarce and even contradictory

¹⁹ KONSTAN in this volume, 29.

²⁰ E.g. PARKER 2005, 290: 'If one had to identify an Athenian festival day that had an emotional appeal (at least for men) like that of modern western Christmas, the best candidate would be "Beakers" (*Choes*) (middle and constantly mentioned day of the festival known to scholarship as *Anthesteria*).'

sources regarding the emotional impact of the festivity, she promotes an integrative approach for the study of ancient *emotional communities* that requires the empathy of the historian without ever abandoning the position of ‘historical distance’. The cohesive role of emotions in ancient Greek societies will remain a crucial issue in the chapters to come: Christoph MICHELS, for instance, considers the binding force of collective memory, and Sabine MÜLLER focuses on empathy and solidarity as the (desired) response to individual suffering.

The chapters gathered in the next section (‘II. Bilder und Affekte’) carefully expound some of the essential strategies in the representation, elicitation, and exploitation of emotions in visual media. Viktoria RÄUCHLE proposes a conceptual framework for the identification and interpretation of emotion codes in Athenian vase painting – *beyond* body language. The chapter demonstrates that the calm features and restrained gestures typical of Classical (Athenian) art do not necessarily imply lack of emotionality. Firstly, the differentiation between gestures of *ēthos* and gestures of *pathos* often applied by ancient art historians is not (always) adequate for the analysis of the visual record and its emotional content. Some of the controlled and seemingly unaffected gestures do in fact convey emotional content as they refer to complex internal phenomena like *aidōs* or *philia*. Many images furthermore adopt a multi-component strategy for the representation of emotion, which affords the depiction of various *pathē* (e.g. fear, grief, sadness) without the use of expressive body language. Likewise, personifications like Lyssa or Eros convey a figure’s emotional state, without infringing on the rules of propriety. The visual strategies thus conform to the ideal of *sōphrosynē* without completely refraining from the representation of affect.

The chapter by Marion MEYER elaborates on the *emotive potential* of images, with the well-known motif of the reunion between Helen and Menelaus serving as a case study. From the late Archaic time onwards, this scene represents a small yet continuous subject in Athenian vase painting and it is therefore ideally suited to trace the iconographic developments and innovations with regard to the elicitation of *pathos*: while vase paintings of the late sixth century BC rely on the viewers’ familiarity with the mythological context to experience an emotional reaction, the images of the fifth century BC by and by develop a vast array of specifically visual emotive effects. MEYER identifies three main strategies to elicit *pathos* in the beholder, namely the effect of surprise (i. e. by deviating from iconographic conventions and disappointing viewing habits), the calculated use of associations and parallels (both iconographic and semantic), and the possibility to empathize through the depicted events (by creating points of reference). A particular interesting case presents itself on the northern metopes of the Parthenon, where Helen takes refuge from her infuriated (ex-)husband at the cult statue of Athena (who, according to the literary account, could not care less for the fate of Helen). By introducing the tutelary goddess of the city, the image not only allows the Athenians to fully identify with the myth, it also

suggests a decisively political reading as it confirms and reinforces the power of Athena, hence the power of Athens.

Michael KREWET opens the curtain to the theatre stage ('III. Emotionen auf der Theaterbühne') with a close reading of Sophocles' *Philoctetes*: premiered in 409 BC, the play comments on the difficult political situation in the city of Athens shortly after the traumatic defeat in the Sicilian Expedition and the oligarchic *coup d'état*, and on the eve of a new military intervention against Sparta. In this context, the protagonists of the myth act as paragons for the main social groups in the *polis*: Philoctetes represents the exiled or politically isolated citizen; Neoptolemus the young citizen longing for honour and glory; and Odysseus the political and military leader. Applying Aristotle's emotion theory as a hermeneutical tool, KREWET elaborates on the pivotal role of cognition in the Sophoclean representation of various emotional episodes (such as *aidōs*, *timē*, *philia*, and *orgē*). With this cognitive-evaluative approach to emotion *avant la lettre*, he argues, Sophocles affords his viewers to fully comprehend the emotions of all the involved characters and, as a result, to scrutinize their own position with regard to the common good.

The chapter by Emiliano BUIS studies modes of exaggerating, inverting, and perverting (civic) emotions in comedy and thus tackles various issues discussed in this volume 'through the backdoor'. BUIS investigates the comic transformation of judicial *pathē* such as *eleos* and *orgē* ('pity' and 'rage') in Aristophanes' *Wasps* as a form of criticism against aberrations in democratic tribunals. At the heart of this parodistic operation lies a clever reversal of collectively shared, civic *pathos* into individual hyper-emotionality: the justified plea for pity by someone underserving is turned into an absurdly exaggerated begging for mercy by a proven culprit, thus an individual claim to be spared from justice. In a similar manner, the collective indignation and longing for retaliation as the appropriate and necessary emotional reaction towards outlaws and enemies of the state is inverted in Aristophanes' character Philocleon who erratically and indiscriminately acts out his rage. As any parody requires a certain familiarity with the targeted structures in order to unfold its comic potential, BUIS' analysis not only sheds light on Aristophanes' comic criticism, but also helps to gain a better understanding of the processes at court and the huge impact of emotions in jurisdiction, thus confirming the observation stressed by PAGE and MICHELS that the seemingly objective and rational domain of forensic and symbouleutic oratory in fact relied to a great extent upon a 'complex "affective" machinery'.²¹

With the chapters by Sven PAGE and Christoph MICHELS we leave the spectator stands of the theatre and turn our attention to the political stage ('IV. Emotionen auf der politischen Bühne'). PAGE analyses the role of *pathos* in the communication between the Athenian citizens (*dēmos*) and their political leaders

²¹ BUIS in this volume, 189.

(*demagōgoi*) during the Peloponnesian War. Political decision-making in democratic Athens was not determined by rational motives alone, but was to a great extent also influenced by exuberant *pathos*. Contrary to the ideal political leader as a guardian of reason and sobriety, the demagogues used a wide repertoire of strategies to control and manipulate the affective states of the crowd as well as to dominate the social discourse on emotion norms and feeling rules. Far from exerting a moderating influence on the incensed mob, they appeared as emotion catalysts, as arsonists in an already heated atmosphere. Needless to say, playing with fire was just one of many tools in the power game between the people and their leaders: rationality and emotionality were two sides of the same coin.

Christoph MICHELS investigates the emotive power of historic *exempla* in symbouleutic and forensic speeches in Classical Athens. References to a glorious past, firmly anchored in the collective memory, brought forth a variety of emotional reactions among the Athenian citizens who were gathered in the *ekklēsia* or the *heliaia*: from taking pride in being part of this marvellous *polis* and the resulting desire to preserve or even enhance its fame through wise decisions – to the feeling of shame, lest one might diminish the reputation of Athens by taking the wrong side. The experience of these decisively civic emotions generated, at least during the time of the assembly, a sense of communal identity among the audience, which not only helped the respective demagogue to influence the process of decision-making in his favour, but also consolidated the citizens' acceptance in the political system as such. For MICHELS, these emotionally charged references to the past are then not just rhetorical gimmicks in the orator's box of tricks – they are an integral part of the political culture in democratic Athens and thus of the cultural identity as a whole.²²

While MICHELS concentrates on the identification with the *polis* qua positive *exempla*, the chapters in the final section ('V. Leiden für die Polis') consider cases of individual or collective suffering. Sabine MÜLLER analyses speeches of Aischines and Demosthenes, the famous antagonists in Athens during the rise of the Macedonian empire. Both political players integrate various narratives of individual suffering and link these with the fate of the battered city of Athens in order to demonstrate their complete identification with the *polis*. Just as the evocation of affirmative *paradeigmata*, these recourses to individual suffering and their connection to collective traumata are employed by the orators as rhetorical strategies so that they appear as exemplary citizens. Needless to say, the opponent would often expose these 'tales of woe' as fretful laments or self-pity, thus counteracting the intended effect of self-promotion.

²² See MICHELS in this volume, 247: 'Insofern sollten emotional aufgeladene Vergangenheitsbezüge nicht als bloßer Firnis oder als rhetorische Tricks der Demagogen gesehen werden, sondern als eine Ausdrucksform der politischen Kultur des demokratischen Athen, die wiederum in höchstem Maße bestimmend für Athens kulturelle Prägung war.'

Isabelle KÜNZER investigates narratives of voluntary self-sacrifice as the most intense form of identification with the norms and values of the *polis* – throughout Greece, a popular and frequently treated topos after the heroic death of Leonidas at the battle of Thermopylae. After a theoretical introduction to the concept of *oblative altruistic autothanasia*, i. e. the sacrificial suicide of an individual for the sake of the community at the behest of a higher (divine) authority, KÜNZER elaborates on the complex relation between pragmatic and emotional elements within these sagas of self-sacrifice: while at first sight the decision of the individual to resort to this extreme measure seems to be grounded on rational motives (in a plain cost-benefit-calculation, the salvation of the city or community clearly outweighs the death of an individual), the pathos-ridden depiction of the events and the detailed accounts of the hero's Faustian struggle between bravery and survival instinct challenge the notion of purely rational decision-making. The highly dramatic style of the narratives emotionally affects the audience, which again serves a didactic-pragmatic function as it appeals to the desire among the citizens to emulate the heroic deed and to sacrifice, if not life and limb, at least (some of) their self-interest for the sake of the common good. Ultimately, *pathos* is put at the service of reason.

As far as the (modern academic) eye can see, 'emotions abounded in Classical city-states'.²³ Sure, hyperemotionality and self-interested *pathos* threatened the social order and had to be held at bay. However, emotions were not exclusively considered to be disruptive factors, counteracting the dominant ideology of self-restraint or jeopardizing the social harmony. On the contrary, moderate emotions, which refrained from excess and were open to reason, were conceived of as indispensable tools to internalize the collective norms and adhere to the values of society. Likewise, the collective experience of civic emotions, from mutual *philia* among the citizens to rage in court against the lawbreaker, never only served short-term political objectives, but helped to foster the identification with the *polis* and to generate social cohesion – and thus ultimately proved a crucial factor in strengthening the political system of democracy.

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²³ KONSTAN in this volume, 28.

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Personen- und Sachregister

Die Schlagworte, überwiegend Substantive im Singular, verweisen auch auf Adjektive und Verbalgefüge in allen Flexionen. So sind etwa unter dem Schlagwort „Furcht“ auch Nennungen von „furchtsam“ und „sich fürchten“ aufgeführt.

Die englischen Synonyme der deutschen Schlag- und Stichworte sind ebenfalls aufgelistet, verweisen aber mit einem Pfeil → auf den führenden deutschen Eintrag, z. B. anger → Wut. Verweise zwischen verwandten Begriffen sind mit ↔ gekennzeichnet, z. B. *ēthos* ↔ Charakter.

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