LANCE ASHDOWN

Anonymous Skeptics

Religion in Philosophy and Theology
3

Mohr Siebeck

Religion in Philosophy and Theology

3

Lance Ashdown

Anonymous Skeptics

Swinburne, Hick, and Alston

Mohr Siebeck

LANCE ASHDOWN, born 1966, 1984–88 undergraduate study of English at the University of Florida and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (B.A.); 1989–91 graduate studies in religion at Florida State University (M.A.); 1992–97 doctoral studies at Claremont Graduate School (M.A. in philosophy, Ph.D. in religion); since 1997 adjunct instructor at various colleges, writer for a software company, pursuit of academic interests as an independent scholar.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Ashdown, Lance:
Anonymous skeptics : Swinburne, Hick, and Alston / Lance Ashdown. –
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002
(Religion in philosophy and theology; Bd. 3)
ISBN 3-16-147679-4 / eISBN 978-3-16-163126-9 unveränderte eBook-Ausgabe 2024

The book was printed by Gulde-Druck in Tübingen on non-aging paper and bound by Heinr. Koch in Tübingen.

Printed in Germany.

ISSN 1436-3003

Preface

This book began as my doctoral dissertation, which I successfully defended in 1997 at the Claremont Graduate School. In 2000, Professor D. Z. Phillips wrote me that Professor Ingolf Dalferth was soliciting manuscripts for a series in philosophy of religion to be published by Mohr Siebeck. After reorganizing and editing the dissertation to make it suitable for publication as a book, I submitted it for review. To my delight, it was accepted.

First and foremost, I wish to acknowledge the guidance of Professor Phillips, who has assisted and encouraged me not only in writing the original dissertation but in submitting it for publication. His philosophical influence on the content, methodology, and style of this work is pervasive. Quite simply, he taught me how to do philosophy. He accepted nothing less than my best work and helped me to see how to produce it; I owe him an enormous debt. I also gratefully acknowledge Professors Al Louch and Stephen Davis for their comments on the original dissertation, and Professor Dalferth and Georg Siebeck for making my dream of publishing a book a reality. Finally, I wish to express deep gratitude and appreciation to my family and to Jennifer, who offered counsel and support whenever it was needed – as it usually was.

Table of Contents

Preface V

Introduction 1

Hume's Religious Skepticism 2

Cartesian External World Skepticism 5

Logical Skepticism 7

Anonymous Skepticism 9

Swinburne's Skepticism 10

Hick's Skepticism 11

Alston's Skepticism 12

The Implications of Skepticism 14

Externalism and Radical Skepticism 15

Skepticism and Forms of Life 15

Stroud on Skepticism 16

Language, World, and God 17

Part I Externalism, Skepticism, and Forms of Life

1 Externalism and the View from Nowhere 21

Definition of Externalism 22

Characteristics of Externalism 23

Externalism is a Philosophical Theory 23

Externalism Bifurcates Language and Reality 24

Externalism Is Not the Evaluation of Specific Beliefs 24

Externalism Restricts Us to Appearances 24

Externalism Is Concerned with the View from Nowhere 25

Externalism Has Many Names 25

Externalism Is Presumed to be Intelligible 26

Externalism Sees Human Beings as Claimants 27

2 The Skeptical Challenge 29

Cartesian Doubt 30

Responses to Cartesian Doubt 32

Stroud's Party Example 35

Knowledge and Trust 37

Does "I know" Mean "I cannot be wrong"? 38

The State of Knowledge ... 40
After the Party Is Over ... 42
Philosophy and Everyday Life ... 43
The Airplane Spotters ... 43
Can Our Epistemic "Manual" Be Wrong? ... 45
Perceptions and Illusions ... 49
Is Talk of Experiences Always Intelligible? ... 50
Are Perceptions Mind-Dependent? ... 50
Can Deception Be Total? ... 53
Descartes' Evil Demon ... 53
Having an Experience ... 55
Stroud's Contribution ... 57

3 Skepticism and Forms of Life ... 59
Stroud on Moore ... 60
Malcolm, Ambrose, and Chappell ... 60
Moore as the Plain Man ... 62
Does Moore Miss the Point of Skepticism? ... 63
Does Moore Contradict Skepticism? ... 64
The Depth of Moore ... 66
In Certain Circumstances ... 66
The Unintelligibility of Doubt ... 68
Certainty, Externalism, and Forms of Life ... 68
Knowledge and Language-Games ... 70
Knowledge and Forms of Life ... 71
Knowledge and World Pictures ... 74
Claimants, Spotters, and Villagers ... 76
Consider a Tribe ... 77
Moore's King ... 80
The Externalist Theories of Swinburne, Hick, and Alston ... 81

Part II Language, World, and God

4 Skepticism and Language ... 87
Externalist Theories of Language ... 89
Do Swinburne, Hick, and Alston Hold an Externalist Theory of Language? 90
The Theater of Ideas ... 91
Believers of Meanings ... 94
Swinburne's Theory of Language ... 95
The Meaning of Words ... 96
Coherent and Incoherent Statements ... 96
Acquisition of Language ... 99
Skepticism in Swinburne's Theory of Language ... 99
The Circularity of Words and Statements ... 100
Buried Contradictions ... 101
The Testimony Principle ... 105
Hick's Theory of Language ... 108

The "Stream of Judgments" ... 109
Concepts as Artifacts and Abilities ... 110
Experiencing-As ... 111
Skepticism in Hick's Theory of Interpretation and Construction ... 112
Unconscious Hypotheses ... 112
Language as Social Product ... 116
Language As Interpretation ... 119
Alston's Theory of Language ... 122
Sense-Perceptual Practice (SP) ... 122
The Justification of Concepts ... 124
Skepticism in Alston's Theory of Doxastic Practices ... 125

5 Skepticism and the External World ... 131
Externalist Theories of Perception ... 132
Do Swinburne, Hick, and Alston Hold an Externalist Theory of Perception? 133
The Inner "Something" ... 134
The Imprecision of Ordinary Speech ... 135
Ordinary Statements As Claims ... 140
Swinburne's Theory of Perception ... 143
Mental and Physical Events ... 144
Public and Private Perceptions ... 146
The Principle of Credulity ... 147
Believers in Propositions ... 150
Primitive Reactions ... 155
Hick's Theory of Perception ... 157
Unconscious Interpretation of the World ... 158
The Interpretation of Bodies ... 159
Unconfirmable Interpretations ... 160
Trust in Interpretations ... 163
Trust as a Primitive Reaction ... 167
Alston's Theory of Perception ... 168
Theory of Appearing ... 169
The Rational Justification for SP ... 172
Immediately Justified Perceptual Beliefs ... 174
The Reliability of SP ... 178
The Inevitability of Circularity ... 182
Alston on Doxastic Practices ... 182
Scepticism and Prima Facie Justification ... 190

6 Skepticism and God ... 193
Externalist Theories of God ... 194
Do Swinburne, Hick, and Alston Hold an Externalist Theory of God? ... 195
Can God Be the Cause of Everything? ... 196
Is God a "Something"? ... 200
Is Religious Practice the Result of Religious Belief? ... 201
Is Faith Bolstered by Proof? ... 203
Can God Be Known Theoretically? ... 205
Is Belief in God a Claim? ... 207
Do the Believer and the Atheist Contradict One Another? ... 209

Swinburne's Theory of God 213
The Definition of Theism 213
The Explanation for the World 214
Bayes's Theorem 216
The Cosmological Argument 222
Is the World a Thing? 223
How Does God Cause the World? 228
Is God a Person? 230
Hick's Theory of God 231
The Religious Ambiguity of the Universe 231
The Pluralistic Hypothesis 232
Does Plurality Imply Ambiguity? 234
Missing the Logical Objections to Theism and Naturalism 235
Is the Real an Uncheckable Hypothesis? 238
Is One Real Interpreted In Various Ways? 239
Alston's Theory of God 244
Is CMP a Hypothesis? 246
Does the Christian Tradition Derive from CMP? 247
Can a Religious Tradition Be Overridden? 248

7 Epilogue: Epistemology of Religion After Skepticism 253

A Crashing Stroud's Party 257

B Skepticism and On Certainty 265

References 275

Index of Names 279

Index of Subjects 281

Introduction

> You are therefore by your principles forced to deny the reality of sensible things, since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are a downright skeptic. So I have gained my point, which was to show your principles led to skepticism.
> —George Berkeley (1979, p. 42)

> The most dangerous form of skepticism is always that which least looks like it.
> —Soren Kierkegaard (1941, p. 275)

One of the traditional tasks of philosophy of religion since the Enlightenment has been to provide reasons or foundations for religious belief. In part, this foundationalist project has been a reaction to philosophers who questioned the reasonableness of belief in God. To these critics, religious belief is unwarranted or lacking sufficient evidence. The deepest skeptics, however, have questioned the very sense of religious language. To these critics, religious belief is not ill-advised or unwarranted, but nonsensical.

In response to such strong opposition, some philosophers and theologians have felt that standards of intellectual integrity required them to offer an apology or defense of faith, or else be, like Alyosha in Doestoyevski's novel, "embarrassed without proofs or without evidence" (Bouwsma, 1984, p. 5). They may even have thought that "in seeking for evidence they 'do God service,' helping along the cause of the Scripture by a straw or two straws here or there, helping in this way to move a mountain" (Bouwsma, 1984, p. 19). This anti-skeptical defense amounts in its strongest form to an argument or proof that belief in God is more reasonable than unbelief, and in its mildest form that belief in God is no more unreasonable than unbelief – and in both cases argues that regardless of how *reasonable* religious belief may be, religious language is clearly *meaningful.*[1]

---

[1] For some contemporary examples of the former see Swinburne (1979), Craig (1979); for the latter see Penelhum (1983).

The epistemology of religion is seen, in large part, as an evaluation of the evidence put forward by apologists for the belief in God.

Hume's Religious Skepticism

Because the deepest challenge to religious belief comes from the radical skeptics, discussions about the success or failure of defenses of religious belief lead naturally into discussions of philosophical skepticism. The most elegant, historically significant, and deepest skeptical challenge is offered through the mouth of Philo in David Hume's classic *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. Philo argues against Cleanthes that the attempt to argue from the nature or existence of the world to the existence of God, which is a classic weapon in the apologetic arsenal, is confused. In preparation for his audacious claim, Philo says:

> "That all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on experience, and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition, that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar causes; I shall not, at present, much dispute with you. But observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the causes be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon" (1947, p. 147).

Assume that we have experience of, for example, houses and builders. We have seen builders building houses. When we come upon a house, we may suppose this house to have been constructed by builders, since we have always seen builders and houses conjoined in the past. But what happens when we have experience of a thing – say, a strange contraption – that we cannot associate with any cause in our experience? If the thing that we experience is similar to other things that we know to have a certain type of cause, then we may suppose this unknown thing to have similar causes. Philo cautions us, however, to use such analogical reasoning judiciously.

The question that Philo addresses is: is the traditional argument from world to God a judicious use of analogical reasoning? Is the world a member of a class of things or events that we have experienced, so that we are warranted in making the logical jump from world to God? In response to this type of analogical reasoning, Philo says:

> "But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines; and from their similarity in some circumstances inferred a similarity in their causes?" (1947, p. 147).

He further asks: "Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference?" (1947, p. 147). The "great disproportion" that Philo speaks of is of

grammar, not degree. Philo argues that if God is represented as a causal hypothesis explaining the existence or character of the world, then we must admit that a test for God's existence is logically excluded. We cannot provide an independent test for God's existence because while we have experience of classes of causes and classes of effects that occur *in* the world, we can necessarily have no experience of causes *beyond* the world. Since the world is not and cannot be spoken of as a "something" that we can pick out within our experience, there can be no similarities between it and some class of causes, which implies that we have no more reason to say that one thing is the cause of the universe than another. Because there can be no test for the truth or falsity of religious claims, and since the concepts of truth and falsity cannot apply to statements about God, what sense is there in talking about God?[2]

Philosophy of religion has never really recovered from Hume's devastating logical criticism.[3] The ghost of Hume, though often ignored, dismissed, or explained away, still haunts the academy, often in unrecognized ways. D. Z. Phillips writes:

"Hume's criticisms constitute a powerful attack on the notion of two worlds, an earthly

---

[2] Hume scholars debate about where Philo ends up on the logical status of religious statements. At one point in the *Dialogues* he assents to what is sometimes called the "bare claim": "that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence" (1947, p. 227). How can Hume raise such devastating logical objections to talk of God as a hypothesis and then turn around and advance this "bare claim"?

Simon Blackburn argues that Hume is here assenting to what he calls an "inert proposition," i.e., a proposition for which it "makes no difference intellectually or rationally that we make the assent" (1999). "For [Hume's] polemical purposes," Blackburn says, "he does not need to remove even the quantificational reference to the supersensible as meaningless. Something about which nothing can be said is as good as nothing" (1999). On this reading, Hume knows full well the logical implications of his argument, but offers the bare claim since it says nothing and so can make no difference (leaving open the question of why he would even bother saying it if it were not worth saying).

Yet Philo appears inconsistent when he speaks of the possibility of "new and unknown principles [that] would actuate [nature] in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe," a remark that suggests that Philo thinks it makes sense to speak of a cause of the universe. How does this remark square with his earlier logical objection? Ben Tilghman argues: "From our point of view I think we should say that Philo does not understand the full implications of the demolition job he has done on Cleanthes' argument. He thinks that nothing can be concluded about the causes of the world. In the passage just quoted, however, he sees clearly that causal investigations are used in particular contexts within the world and then mistakenly concludes that we are in no position to draw conclusions about the world as a whole. What I suggest he should have realized is that since our notions of causality together with our practices of making causal inferences have applications only within particular contexts, to rip them out of any such context in which we understand them is to talk nonsense and to make empty gestures" (1999). In contrast to Blackburn's reading of Hume as the demolition man who destroys the possibility of sense in religion but offers the innocuous "bare claim," Tilghman depicts Hume as not fully recognizing the skeptical implications of his own logical objections.

one and a heavenly one, the latter being the explanation of the former. He is, I believe, an advocate of belief in one world, the world we know: a world in which we find no evidence of the existence of God, and from which we have neither reason nor need to infer a divine reality" (1976, p. 22).

In calling us back to the "one world, the world we know," Hume placed a formidable obstacle in the path of the apologetic machine. Unarguably, philosophy of religion has been troubled and continues to be troubled by Philo's anti-apologetic arguments. The question is whether it has been troubled enough. It is possible that philosophy of religion has not only failed to be sufficiently troubled by Hume's logical attack, but failed to be sufficiently troubled by the other types of skeptical arguments are relevant to apologetics?

As we shall see, the challenge to the traditional task of philosophy of religion by no means stops with Philo: other forms of skepticism are, if anything, even deeper problems. Skepticism at its deepest questions the sense of a language or, to put it differently, argues for the impossibility of speaking in a certain way given that independent tests for the truth of assertions are logically excluded. Skepticism always leaves us, in short, with senseless language. Since philosophers of religion make use of many different sorts of concepts in their epistemological theories, skepticism provides a threat for the philosopher of religion that goes beyond the consideration of merely religious concepts.

---

[3] At one point Philo makes an apparent quasi-religious confession that does not square with his fierce skeptical attacks. When reflecting on Philo's admission that "a purpose, an intention or design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker" (1947, p. 202), Phillips asks: "Shouldn't we be puzzled by this strange contradiction?" (1976, p. 23). Phillips agrees with Norman Kemp Smith that "something is evidently wrong in [Hume's and Kant's] statement of the situation" (1976, p. 24). Phillips suggests that "if someone's philosophical outlook is dominated by certain possibilities, even when he is impressed by nature in various ways, he will give a philosophical account of these impressions in terms of the only intellectual possibilities he sees open to him" (1976, p. 25). That is, a philosopher's account of what it is to be religious may not do justice to religious sentiments that the philosopher actually has, however weak they may be. This explanation of Philo's confession is perhaps the best we can have.

Whether or not this explanation is accepted, our concern is with the skepticism in Hume's work: Philo's apparent proclivity toward religious sentiments and his inconsistent language about the causes of the universe need not concern us. We can draw out the full force of Hume's skeptical implications for ourselves regardless of whether he acknowledges them. Henceforth, when we speak of "Hume's logical objection," we speak of the objection that is implied in what Philo says, putting aside any of Philo's comments that appear to weaken or contradict this objection.

Cartesian External World Skepticism

By far the most influential and discussed type of modern skepticism has been Cartesian or "external world" skepticism.[4] It is deeper than Humean skepticism about God for it questions whether we can know anything "outside of our minds," a class that is said to include physical objects, people, and religious realities.[5] It should constitute a severe problem for religious apologists, since if our knowledge of the world is called into doubt, then so is any argument that infers the existence of God based on knowledge of the world.

In his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes famously seeks to discover a firm and certain foundation for his beliefs. He argues that the most effective way to provide this foundation is to doubt the very foundations on which his beliefs are based, a procedure whose "greatest benefit lies in freeing us from all our preconceived opinions, and providing the easiest route by which the mind may be led away from the senses. The eventual result of this doubt is to make it impossible for us to have any further doubts about what we subsequently discover to be true" (1986, p. 12).[6] Descartes decides to doubt the information provided by his sensory experience, since "whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses" (1986, p. 18).

In a famous passage, written while sitting in his study before the fire, Descartes concludes that he cannot know that he is not dreaming since "there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep" (1986, p. 19). This lack of a test must then throw all of his knowledge into question, for how can he claim to know something if he cannot rule out the possibility that he dreams it? He considers the possibility of whether mathematical truths remain true even in dreams, and whether the content of dreams is necessarily dependent on information received in waking consciousness.[7]

---

[4] It would be a mistake, however, to think that skepticism began with Descartes. Richard Popkin traces the development of skepticism in its Pyrrhonian form through its resurgence in the Renaissance, showing the ways in which various Christian and Humanist groups made us of skeptical arguments to discredit their opponents (1979). When Descartes raised his famous skeptical doubt in the Seventeenth Century, he did so against the backdrop of this long-standing debate. Terence Penelhum draws upon Popkin in examining the various ways that skepticism has been brought to bear on the rationality of religious belief (1983).

[5] G. E. Moore does us a philosophical service by showing that philosophers are often unclear on what exactly is to stand inside and what outside our minds, using the expressions "as if they needed no explanation" (1959, p. 128). He attempts to make the division clearer by arguing for a distinction between things "presented in space" and things "that are to be met with in space," where the former class includes things such as "after-images, double images, bodily pains" that should not be considered "external things" (1959, pp. 134–5).

[6] All page numbers in Descartes quotes refer to those in Volume VII of the standard Latin edition of the *Ouvres de Descartes* (1641). These page numbers appear in the margins of the Cottingham translation from which all Descartes quotes are taken (1986).

To take his methodological doubt to its furthest extreme, Descartes imagines that "some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me" (1986, p. 22). Since all of our knowledge relies in some way on our sense-experience, Descartes concludes we can never be sure that the demon is not deceiving us on any particular matter: no matter what test or check we use to determine whether we are being deceived, skepticism can always rejoin that the test is itself a deception.

It is a mistake to downplay the seriousness of Descartes' radical skeptical challenge. The challenge is not that we cannot be certain of how the world is, in the sense that we can be 99% certain but not 100% certain, but that we are logically prevented from determining how the world is.[8] We are logically prevented from knowing whether the world is anything like our perception of it or even whether it exists.

The radical thesis of the skeptical challenge is that our ordinary factual statements are senseless. Why? We have no way of checking whether any particular claim about reality is true or false (and as will become apparent later, the notion that our ordinary statements can be philosophically construed as "claims" is a crucial assumption).[9] We cannot even say that the world *probably* is as we think it is, since whatever evidence we appeal to is open to the same skeptical doubt. For example, it makes sense to say that it will probably rain only if it makes sense to determine that it has in fact rained on a number of occasions in the past – a question that, according to skepticism, we have no way of settling. If the external world skeptic is right, then we have no reason to believe that we correctly identify our own names. We have no reason to believe that we understand the nature of our bodies or even whether we have bodies. And we certainly cannot know any religious truths, if these truths must be inferred from knowledge about the world.

---

[7] In the Sixth Meditation he considers another objection to the dream argument, "for I now notice that there is a vast difference between the two, in that dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions of life as waking experiences are" (1986, p. 89). For a criticism of the notion that dreams and waking experiences can be said to have the same content – which Descartes assumes – see Malcolm' ("Dreaming and Skepticism" in Sesonske & Fleming, 1965, pp. 5–25) and Wittgenstein (1967, para 396–400). For a criticism that dreams have a distinctive "dream-like" quality to them see Austin (1969).

[8] The first challenge is more characteristic of Academic skepticism. Popkin writes: "Since the evidence for any [knowledge-claim about the world] would be based, according to the skeptics, on either sense information or reasoning, and both of these sources are unreliable to some degree, and no guaranteed or ultimate criterion of true knowledge exists, or is known, there is always some doubt that any non-empirical or trans-empirical proposition is absolutely true, and hence constitutes real knowledge. As a result, the Academic skeptics said that nothing is certain. The best information we can gain is only probable, and is to be judged according to probabilities" (1979, p. xiv). Richard Swinburne, as we shall see, argues in the same vein. The difficulty is that for the radical Cartesian skeptic, the epistemological problem is not that our sources for information about the world are "unreliable to some degree," but that we have no way of determining whether they are unreliable or not.

If a philosopher accepts a view of God as a causal explanation and a Cartesian view of the mind as a private theater of ideas, then he or she must show how or why both Philo and the Cartesian skeptical arguments are mistaken or confused. If not, then he or she appears to be driven into skepticism regarding claims about God and the physical world. Unfortunately, the problems do not end there.

Logical Skepticism

The deepest form of skepticism questions not the sense of this or that type of claim, but the possibility of offering any claim whatsoever – including, of course, a religious claim. We can call this form of skepticism "logical skepticism," in that it questions the possibility of language having sense.[10] For skepticism about language to get off the ground, there must be a philosophical view of language that allows it. Take this following classic account of language from John Locke, some version of which stills haunts analytical philosophy to this day:

> "God having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye of Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame particular Sounds, which we call Words . . . .
>
> Besides particular Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be able to use these Sounds, as Sign of internal Conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another" (1971, p. 402).

On Locke's picture, human beings have access only to their own minds and must infer whether people, things, and events exist outside of their minds. Language

---

[9] One controversial area in Descartes scholarship concerns the notion of the so-called "Cartesian circle." The challenge of the circle is that Descartes needs to prove that God exists and is no deceiver in order to guarantee the truth of the rule which states that all clear and distinct perceptions are true, but uses this very rule in order to prove that God exists. Cottingham argues that Descartes may be able to escape the circle by arguing that "there are some propositions of which I can enjoy self-evident knowledge, so long as I continue to attend to them, without any need for a divine guarantee" (1986, p. 67). The point of proving God's existence is to guarantee the truth of those perceptions that we are not presently attending to. But as Collingwood points out, this claim appears to contradict Descartes' statement in Meditation One that "there is nothing among the things I once believed to be true which it is not permissible to doubt," a remark which implies that no propositions that he attends to are incapable of being mistaken, even those that seem most obviously true. Whether or not Descartes' final view was that he could or could not be wrong about even those self-evident truths that he was attending to, we can formulate a skeptical objection that would make that much deeper, more radical claim. Descartes may not have intended to "open the door" of radical skepticism, but now that philosophers see that it can be opened in this way, it cannot be closed.

occurs when we place labels on ideas that we form in our minds, articulate these labels, and (if we are successful) create the same ideas in other minds. The skeptical problem is that we have no test for whether the idea in the mind of any perceiver is the same as the idea in the minds of others.

According to Locke's account, I can think of a blue cup, talk about a blue cup to someone else, and by so doing generate a picture of a blue cup in this person's mind. The wily skeptic asks: "How can I know whether the idea in my mind when I say 'blue' is the same as the idea in yours? Maybe I call 'blue' what you call 'yellow'." I may then think that I can point to a blue cup and say "This is the idea that I have in my mind." But the skeptical doubt arises that his interpretation of the pointing is the same as mine. Perhaps he pointed at the color while I pointed at the shape. Even worse, how can he even be sure that when we point we are indicating the name of something? Maybe we are just stretching.

Locke's picture of communication does not allow us to be certain of the meaning of any word since it excludes the possibility of an independent check for sense. The skeptical doubt emerges in this way: "Even if I name my ideas and communicate only with myself, I can still never be sure that my memory of the name of any idea is correct: how do I know, for example, that my memory that this color is called 'blue' is not mistaken?" Consequently, the possibility of sense in language – *any* language, including religious language – is called into question. If philosophers of religion hold a picture of language along the lines of Locke's, then they are open to the objections of logical skepticism.

---

[10] This form of skepticism has received little attention by philosophers of religion, although Kripke's account of Wittgenstein's rule-skepticism has raised considerable discussion in the wider philosophical community (Kripke, 1982). Although the attention given to logical skepticism is welcome, there are strong reasons to think that Kripke's account of it does more harm than good. Peter Winch has argued convincingly that Kripke is confused when he represents Wittgenstein as posing a "skeptical problem" about language in the *Philosophical Investigations* and then posing a "skeptical solution" (1987, p. 54). This misrepresentation of Wittgenstein as a skeptic does not imply, however, that Wittgenstein was unconcerned with skepticism about language or thought it was trivial or stupid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein identifies "the great question" in philosophy as that of the essence of language – i.e., what makes language so much as possible (1958, para 65). This great question is the central philosophical question since to understand philosophy is to understand language. Rush Rhees expresses this conception thus: "We cannot understand the central ideas of philosophy – such ideas as reality, truth, things, intelligibility, understanding – we cannot understand the role they play in language unless we try to understand what language is. We cannot understand how it is that puzzlement about them and puzzlement about language (about what 'saying something' is, for instance) are so run into one another that we can hardly distinguish them. So that skepticism regarding them is skepticism regarding the reality of discourse" (1969, p. 135). For Wittgenstein and Rhees, logical skepticism or "skepticism regarding the reality of discourse" is the deepest issue of philosophy.

Anonymous Skepticism

Depending on the nature of his or her theory, a philosopher of religion may be forced to defend against religious, Cartesian, and logical skepticism all at the same time – an unenviable position, to put it mildly. So, how has philosophy of religion addressed this formidable challenge? Our question will lead us to a consideration of three prominent contemporary philosophers of religion: Richard Swinburne, John Hick, and William Alston.[11] As we will discover, these philosophers are indeed open to the criticisms of the three types of skepticism we have discussed. At the same time, none of these philosophers thinks that skeptical objections pose a devastating or unanswerable threat to their epistemologies. For example, each of the three philosophers is an avowed believer in God and is fully aware of the challenge of religious skepticism, yet none believes that skepticism need cause a rational Christian to abandon his or her beliefs.[12] At the same time, each adheres to a philosophical theory that remains open to the devastating critique of Philo – who argues at his deepest, as we have seen, that talk of God is meaningless.

We will see that Swinburne, Hick, and Alston are rightly to be considered as "anonymous skeptics." Readers familiar with the work of the theologian Karl Rahner will recognize an echo of his famous doctrine that non-Christian religious believers are really "anonymous Christians," i.e., Christian believers who do not recognize themselves as such. In a similar way, the philosophers of religion under consideration are skeptics who most certainly would not identify themselves as such. They are anonymous skeptics in the sense that their epistemologies create the very conditions that allow for the severe and, *on their own terms*, unanswerable challenges of skepticism. In other words, their epistemological theories unwittingly *imply* skeptical theses, because these theories invite the very skepticism that they are logically incapable of answering.

---

[11] We shall confine our attention to them because of limitations of space, but they are by no means the only anonymous skeptics on the contemporary scene. In fact, the logical points that we shall raise in relation to their philosophical theories are applicable in some form or another to the overwhelming majority of analytic philosophers of religion (see Chapter 7).

[12] They differ in their attitude toward non-Christian religions. Swinburne argues for the probability of theism, although he acknowledges that "rival creeds" can be argued for as well. It is clear that he views non-theistic religions as competing with theistic religion in their truth-claims and thinks that it is incumbent upon them to provide proofs for their beliefs that can be shown to be better than theistic proofs. Hick does not view the various religions as competitors at all: each is an equally justified interpretation of one transcendent reality. Alston argues that "though this is not epistemically the best of all possible worlds, it is rational in this situation for one to continue to participate in the (undefeated) practice in which s/he is involved, hoping that the inter-practice contradictions will be sorted out in due time" (1991, p. 7).

At first glance, these claims may sound outrageous. Do we mean to imply that Richard Swinburne, the foremost philosophical theist in contemporary epistemology, is a skeptic in disguise? How can that be? His massive trilogy – *The Coherence of Theism*, *The Existence of God*, and *Faith and Reason* – is the most ambitious and tightly argued defense of philosophical theism in contemporary literature. Yet despite his avowed aim of providing rational support for belief in God, Swinburne in fact provides a good example of how the skeptical implications of a philosopher's own position can go completely unrecognized.

Swinburne's Skepticism

Swinburne's epistemology unwittingly commits him to at least *three different kinds* of skeptical conclusions. First, his account of language as a formal system implies a type of logical skepticism in which we cannot argue that any given unit of language is coherent without involving ourselves in a vicious infinite regress. By making the sense of any statement dependent on the sense of some other statement, he rules out any possible test for the sense of propositions. If the sense of proposition *A* depends on a test that is constituted in proposition *B*, we may go on to ask about the sense of proposition *B*, only to be in the same situation as before. In effect, there can be no test for the sense of a proposition whose sense is not itself subject to further doubt. This skeptical challenge in itself is enough to shut down his theist aims – a fact that he does not acknowledge. Surely, if we are logically prevented from testing whether any given statement is intelligible, then it follows that we cannot determine the intelligibility of religious claims.

Second, Swinburne's characterization of belief as a "mental attitude" toward evidence-based propositions renders unintelligible our language of the external world. If every belief is ultimately constituted by evidential propositions, and we can only back up one proposition by appeal to the evidence of another proposition, then how can we ever compare our propositions with the reality that they supposedly reflect? But if we have no independent test to determine whether our evidence is true, then what sense is there in talking about evidence at all? And if there can be no justification for beliefs, then why believe anything?

Finally, because Swinburne insists on speaking of the universe as a physical object, he creates logical space for the skeptical doubt over the coherence of the assumption that we can have empirical evidence for God. Why? If it does not make sense to talk of experience beyond the realm of the universe, then how can he speak of God as an extra-mundane causal hypothesis that is supported or confirmed by our experiences within the world? Swinburne argues for God's existence in a way that allows a skeptic like Philo to show that Swinburne's own assumptions imply that we cannot meaningfully talk about God. Swinburne is, to use D. Z. Phillips's wonderful phrase, a "friend of Cleanthes" (1995, p. 4).

Index of Names

Adams, R. 253
Alston, W. 9, 12, 14, 25, 27, 29, 31, 43, 58–59, 81–84, 88, 90, 94–95, 122–129, 131, 133–134, 136–140, 209, 214, 234, 236, 244–247, 249–251, 253
Ambrose, A. 60
Augustine 106, 108, 209
Austin, J. L. 6, 35, 37, 43, 134, 138, 249, 260, 271
Bambrough, R. 253
Bennett, J. 89
Bennett, W. 91
Berkeley, G. 1, 27, 51, 83, 132, 135–139
Blackburn, S. 3
Bogen, J. 269
Bouwsma, O. K. 1, 54, 134–135, 253
Carr, B. 266
Cavell, S. 16, 79, 100, 249
Chappell, V. C. 61
Clarke, S. 16
Cleanthes 2–3
Cook, J. 267
Cottingham, J. 5, 7
Craig, W. L. 1
Cupitt, D. 253
Descartes, R. 5, 16, 29, 31–32, 35–36, 47–49, 53, 76, 87, 104, 116, 131–132, 246
Dilman, I. 69, 114
Doestoyevski, F. 1, 210
Dorbolo, J. 268
Durkheim, E. 236–237
Feuerbach, L. 236–237
Finch, H. L. 68, 267
Flew, A. 253
Freud, S. 236–237, 246
Gill, J. 76, 265
Glock, H. 72
Hanfling, O. 70
Hegel, G. 47
Hertzberg, L. 167
Hick, J. 9, 11, 25, 27, 29, 31, 43, 58–59, 81–84, 88, 90, 94–95, 108, 111–122, 128–129, 131, 133–134, 136–140, 209, 231–239, 242–244, 250, 253
Hudson, W. D. 269
Hume, D. 2–5, 32, 92, 104
James, W. 163, 209
Kant, I. 29, 49, 233
Kierkegaard, S. 1, 46–47, 211, 255
Kobert, M. 70
Kripke, S. 8
Lloyd, A. C. 68
Locke, J. 7, 11, 83, 87, 89, 91–92, 95, 97, 122, 132, 136
Mackie, J. L. 253
Malcolm, N. 6, 38, 60–61, 74, 77, 118, 267
Marx, K. 246
Maugham, W. S. 210
Merton, T. 242
Moore, G. E. 58–68, 71–76, 78, 80–83, 135, 266–274
Murdoch, I. 211
Nagel, T. 16, 22–23
Orr, D. J. 75, 267
Parmenides 227
Penelhum, T. 1, 5, 16, 253
Phillips, D. Z. 3–4, 10, 16–17, 21, 115, 196, 243, 253, 267
Philo 2–4, 7, 9–10, 209, 224–225, 228, 235, 237–238
Plantinga, A. 253
Plato 88
Popkin, R. 5, 16
Proudfoot, W. 123
Quine, G. V. 158
Quine, W. V. O. 29, 158
Quinn, A. 253
Rahner, K. 9
Rhees, R. 8, 17, 59, 88, 94, 118, 155, 200, 203, 207, 227, 230, 242, 253–254, 267
Rowe, W. 163
Russell, B. 102
Sartre, J. P. 87
Schulte, J. 73, 75
Shiner, R. 70
Smart, N. 253

Smith, N. K. 4
Soles, D. H. 266, 269
Strawson, R. 16
Stroll, A. 16, 65, 70, 265
Stroud, B. 16, 23, 29, 31, 34–35, 39–40, 43–45, 48–49, 57–68, 134, 257–259, 261, 263–264, 266, 268–270, 272, 274
Swinburne on God
  world as physical object 223
Swinburne, R. 1, 9–10, 25, 27, 29, 31, 43, 58–59, 81–84, 88, 90, 94–108, 112, 114, 121–122, 128–129, 131, 133–134, 136–140, 209–210, 213–215, 217, 220–223, 225, 227, 229–231, 234–235, 241, 244, 250, 253
Tilghman, B. 3
Tolstoy, L. 209
Trigg, R. 253
Wainwright, W. 253
Waismann, F. 101
Warnock, G. J. 27, 134–135, 137–138
Weston, M. 47
Winch, P. 8, 46, 75, 101, 201, 212, 242, 253, 267
Wittgenstein, L. 6, 8, 14–15, 17, 39, 42, 46, 48, 55–56, 59, 67–69, 71–77, 80–82, 87, 93, 101–102, 106–107, 111, 114, 117, 119–121, 127–128, 131, 134–135, 209, 211, 224–225, 249–250, 254, 256, 259, 262, 265–270, 273–274
Wolgast, E. 269
Wolterstorff, N. 253

Index of Subjects

Academic skepticism 199
adverbial theory
  of perception 170
airplane spotters example 43
  doubting the manual 63
  metaphor for skepticism 76
Alston on God 244
  Christian mystical practice (CMP) 244
  CMP as hypothesis 246
  CMP as source of tradition 247
  form of life 248–249
  MP as doxastic practice 245
  overrider systems 247
  trial metaphor 251
Alston on language
  contextual beliefs 124
  justification of language 124
  perceptual skills of recognition 128
  phenomenal arrays 124
  sense-perceptual practice (SP) 122
Alston on perception 168
  "no alternative" defense 183
  definition of externalism 170
  does not answer skepticism 178
  epistemic circularity in 179
  overrider systems 184
  pre-reflective genesis of belief 187
  theory of appearing 169
  truth conducivity 172
ambiguity
  plurality and 234
  religious 231
analogical reasoning 2
anonymous skepticism 9
apologetics 2
appearance and reality 22
appearing
  Alston's theory of 169
arguments from illusion 51
atheists
  religious believers and 209
bare claim
  in Hume's *Dialogues* 3
Bayes's Theorem 217, 228
  applied to murder example 220
  relevance criterion 218
beliefs
  about meaning of language 94
  as inner attitudes 150
  Cartesian elimination of false 30
  construed as propositional 151
  foundations for 5
  groundlessness of 72
  in propositions 150
bringing about
  vs. causation 229
Cartesian circle 7
Cartesian doubts
  attempts to dismiss 33
causation
  vs. bringing about 229
certainty
  dream doubt and 6
  form of life and 73
  logical vs. psychological 74
  propositions, action, and 73
Christian mystical practice (CMP) 244
  as hypothesis 246
  overrider system 247
  possibly a mistake 247
  source of Christian tradition 247
Christian tradition
  derived from experience 247
  Zen and 240
circumstances
  knowledge-claims and 66
claimants
  human beings as 27, 141, 150, 272
claims
  ordinary assertions seen as 141
conception of objectivity
  in Stroud 44
contemplative tradition
  in philosophy of religion 253
contradictions
  occur only in practice 101
cosmological argument 222
criterion of simplicity 222
deception

possibility of total 53
Descartes, Rene
demon argument 6
dream doubt 5, 35
evil demon hypothesis 53
doubts 6
about foundations of belief 5
about meaning of language 93
absence of certain 149
abstract and concrete 38
animal certainty and 150
as mental states 151
assumptions and 107
Cartesian 30
certainty and 73
circumstances for 67
depend on what is not doubted 141
erasing religious 210
externalism and skeptical 27
form of life and 149
God test and skeptical 199
hedged claims and 141
logically exclude knowledge 31
methodological 5
presuppose certainty 141, 149
probability and 6
require surroundings 68
skeptical and ordinary 48
special reasons for 36
trust and 164
unintelligibility of 68
doxastic practices 13, 133
characteristics of 245
definition of 184
innocent until proven guilty 189
reliability of 178
dream doubt 5, 87
logically excludes test 31
obsessive 35
empiricism
critiques of 134
general doctrine 132
internal description and 136
objectification and 134
theory of perception 131
Enlightenment 1
epistemic circularity 145, 179
epistemic imperialism 245
everyday life
philosophy and 43
evil demon hypothesis 53
experience
Hick's definition of 232
of seeing 50
ownership of 55
experiencing-as
Hick's theory of 111
explanation
non-standard personal 216
stops with God 222
theism as 214
two types 215
external descriptions 144
external world
acknowledged unknowability of 160
assumptions about 164
descriptions of 144
evil demon and 162
Kant's "scandal" and the 162
knowledge based on senses 158
necessity of assuming 178
principle of credulity and 147
problem of 29
senseless of language concerning 10
skeptical doubts as irrelevant 166
skepticism concerning 5–6, 131
tests for 12
externalism 15
based on confusion 84
definition 22
eight features of 23
emphasis on cognitive 27
God and 194
implicit in ordinary life 23
internal/external distinction 26
internalism and 21
language and reality 24
objective speculation and 22
perception and 132
restricted to appearances 24
skepticism results from 21
specific beliefs and 24
theories of language 89
trial metaphor and 27
varied forms 25
external-world skepticism 5, 30
extralinguistic perspective 46
form of life 15, 69
as interpretation 232
as something animal 76, 155
beliefs occur within 16
certainty and 73
conversion to different 176, 266
do not refer 75
doubts and 149
God and 248

in Cavell 101, 108
in *On Certainty* 69
in Rhees 118
internal relation to language 88
knowledge and 71
language-games vs. 72
Moore's propositions and 71
not an interpretation 121
not based on criteria 249
not true or false 73
philosophy and 254
primitive reactions and 156, 267
tribe examples and 77
trust and 168
varied interpretation 71
God
argument by analogy 2
argument from world to 2
as a "something" 200
as creator 213
as deus ex machina 204
as explanation 198, 214
as hypothesis 3, 224
as objective fact 206
as powerful person 98, 230
as substantive 200
atheism and 197
bare claim and 3
belief in God and 26
best-case scenario for 199
Cartesian circle and 7
coming to know 205–206, 209
cosmological argument and 222
disagreements over reality of 209
externalist theories of 26, 194
faith in 208
metaphysical realism and 194
not a universal concept 196
objective standpoint and 205
philosophical conception of 204
philosophy's concern with 254
praying to 201
presence of 206
proofs for 231
reasonableness of belief in 1
religious practices and 208
skepticism and 199
test for 199
titles for 201
wonder and 205
worshipping the same 242
Hick on God 231
move from self to Real 234
noumena and phenomena 233
perspectival relativism 232
pluralistic hypothesis 232
proofs for God 231
Real is unknowable 234
religious ambiguity of universe 231
transcendent Real 232
Hick on language 108
dispositions in 109
experiencing-as 111
language as social product 116
recognitional capacities 110
stream of judgments 110
the unconscious in 114
unconscious hypotheses 109
Wittgenstein's beetle in the box 120
Hick on perception 157
external world is unknowable 160
human beings as interpreters 161
interpretation is unconfirmable 161
interpretation of bodies 159
interpretation of sensory data 158
private pictures 159
rational justification for trust 163
skepticism makes no difference 162
trust as natural and inevitable 164
unconscious interpretation 158
Hume on religion
bare claim 3
Philo's confession 4
Humean inductive skepticism 32
hypotheses
world-pictures and 75
immediate perception
Berkeley's theory of 138
inappropriate language
vs. senseless language 257
induction
skepticism and 32
ineffability 243
internal descriptions 136, 144
internalism
externalism and 21
interpretation
Hick's theory of 108
judgments
stream of 110
Kierkegaard, Soren
subjective and objective thinking 206
king example
in *On Certainty* 80
knowledge
as mental state 40

of future 39
possibility of error and 38
serious possibilities and 41
trust and 37
knowledge-claims
challenges to 42
promises and 263
surroundings and 67
true vs. appropriate 36
language
as social product 116
based on belief 90, 94
causal relation with reality 46
criterion of coherence 97
criterion of force and liveliness 92
externalist theories of 89
inner processes and 89
Locke's theory of 89
logical privacy 93
reality of 94
Swinburne's theory of 95
translation view of 89
language-acquisition
Swinburne's theory of 99
language-games 70
consideration and 82
extension of 79
liar's paradox 102
logical skepticism 7
deepest form of skepticism 88
definition 88
Kripke and 8
Locke and 8
reality of discourse and 8
sense of life and 88
mental states
knowledge and 40
metaphysical realism 194
Kierkegaard's critique of 47, 206
metaphysical speculation 34
methodological doubt 6
mind/body dualism
Swinburne's theory of 144
mistakes
described in *On Certainty* 266
precluded by knowledge 38
reality and 54
Moore, G. E.
Barry Stroud and 60
the king and 80
Moore's propositions
form of life and 71
mysticism
as flawed report 243
naturalism
religion and 237
normative tradition
in philosophy of religion 253
nothing
as something 227
noumena
relation to Real 233
objectivity
as goal of philosophy 22, 44
embodied in view of world 45
God and 205
Kierkegaard on 205
metaphysics and 47
of phenomenal properties 123, 125
of religious claims 248
subjectivity and 48
On Certainty 68
disagreement over 265
groundlessness of belief 72
mistakes described in 266
Moore's propositions and 69
Philosophical Investigations and 69
propositions in 265
world-pictures in 74
ostensive definitions 106
overrider systems 247
perception
empiricist theory of 131
immediacy of 138
mind-dependence of 51
public and private 146
reality and 49
persons
God and 230
perspectival relativism 232
Philo's skepticism 2
criticisms of God as explanation 198
criticisms of realism 197
Philosophical Investigations
On Certainty and 69
philosophy
everyday life and 43
normative and contemplative 253
philosophy of religion
expectations of 253
pluralistic hypothesis 12, 232
plurality
ambiguity and 234
poltergeists
God and 229
possibilities

abstract and serious 41
serious vs. abstract 261
primitive reactions 155
principle of credulity 31, 147
principles of rationality
Swinburne's theory of 105
probability
based on past 228
excluded by dream doubt 31
in Academic skepticism 6
inductive skepticism and 32
of coherence 103
of intelligent creator 3
of Theism 9
of universe 228
rejected by skepticism 6, 12, 32, 104
skepticism and 31
testimony principle and 99
world-pictures and 81
projection theory 236
promises
knowledge-claims and 263
proofs
for God's existence 231
propositions
in *On Certainty* 265
in Swinburne's theory 97
inert 3
radical skepticism 15
Real
as noumena 233
as unknowable 243
cultural interpretations of 234
depends on context 239
Hick's theory of 232
reality
causal relation with language 46
correspondence with thought 44
mistakes and 54
of discourse 94
relativism
in Hick's theory 232
relevance criterion 218
religion
as move from self to Real 234
naturalism and 237
religious faith
nonbelievers and 209
proof and 203
religious practices
dependent on beliefs 201
not universal 195
religious language and 208
religious skepticism 2
Cartesian skepticism and 199
impact of logical skepticism on 88
representations
reality and 49
saints
in different traditions 242
seeing
vs. experience of seeing 50
sense data
theory of 132, 170
sense experience
as source of belief 5
senseless language
vs. inappropriate language 257
sense-perceptual practice (SP) 122
as best explanation 179
epistemic circularity 179
no noncircular proof of 181
power of prediction 180
rational justification for 172
reliability 178
self-support for 189
skepticism
anonymous 9
Austin's critique of 35
Cartesian 6
Cartesian circle 7
depth of 4, 54, 83
destroys possibility of speculation 34
dream doubt 5
external world 5
externalism and 15
external-world 30, 131
form of life and 15
logical 7
Moore's refutation of 60
radical 15
religious 2
significance of 16, 29
special reasons
for doubt 36
spirit
Swinburne's definition of 213
Stroud on skepticism 16
airplane spotters example 43
bifurcatory picture of reality 182
G. E. Moore and 60
party example 35
subjectivity
objectivity and 48
surroundings
for doubt 68

import for knowledge-claims 67
Swinburne on God
Bayes's Theorem 216
cosmological argument 222
definition of spirit 213
definition of theism 213
definition of world 214
explanatory power of theory 217
God as "stopping-point" 222
God as explanation of world 214
hypothesis is "God exists" 218
murder example 220
nature and character of world 218
predictive power of a hypothesis 217
prior probability of a hypothesis 217
prior probability of evidence 217
relevance criterion 218
types of explanation 215
Swinburne on language
buried contradictions 97
criterion of coherence 97
deduction and induction 97
ignores practices 100
language-acquisition 99
ostensive definitions in 106
summary 98
testimony principle 99, 105
Swinburne on perception 143
beliefs as mental events 150
beliefs in propositions 150
Cartesian theory of mind 143
defeaters for perceptual claims 148
direct access to mental events 143
epistemic circularity 145
external and internal descriptions 144
principle of credulity 147
public and private 146
theory of seeming 144
test
can be a deception 6
cogency of arguments for God 218
excluded by dream doubt 31, 59
for appropriate behavior 166
for God's existence 3, 199
for knowledge 31
for memory 31
for mental states 151
for sense of language 8, 10, 92, 97
for source of beliefs 30
for SP 127, 179
in airplane spotters example 191
necessary for knowledge 5
of force and liveliness 92
open to interpretation 11
ostensive definition 120
results in epistemic circularity 145
sense requires independent 4
testimony principle
Swinburne's theory of 99, 105
theism
as explanation 214
basic claim of 213
concept of world in 214
cosmological argument supports 222
God as creator 213
Swinburne's detective example 220
thought
correspondence with reality 44
trial metaphor 15, 27, 81
externalism and the 133
human beings and 27, 265
language-users and 127
rationality of 251
religious believers and 207
trust
in interpretations 163
knowledge and 37
unconscious interpretation
Hick's theory of 158
view from nowhere 22
village example 77
visual room
Wittgenstein and the 55
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
beetle in the box 120
language-games and 70
meaning of "know" 39
private language 93
visual room example 55
world
as brute fact 214
as collection of things 227
as physical object 222
complexity of 222
religious ambiguity of 231
Swinburne's account of 214
world-pictures
king example 80
knowledge and 74
not a result of reflection 82
not hypotheses 75
village example 77
worship
differences among types of 242
Zen
Christian tradition and 240